In My Time - Dick Cheney [227]
Even before Katrina made landfall, the president had signed an emergency declaration. More than four thousand National Guard troops, under the command of state governors, were deployed; the Federal Emergency Management Agency had prepositioned food, water, and rescue teams; the U.S. Coast Guard was calling in reinforcements from around the country and preparing its helicopters for search and rescue. But the failure of the levees meant that more was needed. Eighty percent of New Orleans was under six to twenty feet of water. Thousands of people who did not evacuate before landfall sought refuge in the Superdome and the New Orleans Convention Center, where there was insufficient food and water. Looting and violence were breaking out.
The president wanted to deploy immediately tens of thousands of U.S. troops, but if they were to have law enforcement authority, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco would have formally to request that the president federalize the response to Katrina, which she refused to do. That left the president with the option of acting against her wishes and declaring Louisiana in a state of insurrection in order to bring in troops. That is the requirement imposed by posse comitatus, an 1878 law that makes a declaration of insurrection necessary if the U.S. military is to be used for domestic law enforcement. The president was understandably reluctant to take the extreme step of assuming control in a state without the governor’s acquiescence, and he also faced resistance from Pentagon leaders, who were reluctant to send troops trained for combat to restore domestic order. But as Governor Blanco continued to dither, the president decided to send in the troops anyway—though they would not have law enforcement powers. It was a risky decision. One can easily imagine scenarios in which U.S. troops are helpless in the face of violence. But the idea was that National Guardsmen, who are not covered by posse comitatus, could act with state and local authorities to take law enforcement responsibility. And it was an idea that worked.
Shortly after the president’s announcement, Andy Card told me the president was thinking of setting up a senior-level task force to oversee the relief efforts and wanted to know if I would be willing to chair it. I told him I would, but only if the task force had real responsibility. I would need the authority to hire and fire people and to move in and really get things done. It didn’t take me long to figure out that the task force idea had originated with the communications staff and would put me in a role that was primarily symbolic. I would be a figurehead without the ability really to do anything about the performance of the federal agencies involved. This wouldn’t be helping. It would be creating a distraction, and I let Card know that I wasn’t enthusiastic. The matter was dropped.
At the president’s request I traveled to the Gulf coast on September 8 to get a firsthand look at the situation. Lynne and I traveled first to Gulfport, Mississippi, where Michael Chertoff, the extremely competent secretary of homeland security, came on board Air Force Two to brief us, then accompanied us to the National Guard center where the emergency response was being coordinated. We met with state and local officials, including Governor Haley Barbour, then walked through the Second