In My Time - Dick Cheney [231]
Foreign Arab fighters flowed into Iraq, primarily through Syria, to wage jihad. Many of these fighters flew into Damascus, where they boarded buses and were driven to the Syrian-Iraqi border. We had numerous internal discussions about the extent to which the Syrian government itself was aware of or facilitating this flow. My view was that given the nature of the Syrian regime, there was no way thousands of terrorists could be bused from Damascus to the Syrian border without the acquiescence of the Assad government. Once inside Iraq these young men hoping to die for Allah strapped on suicide vests and targeted American and Iraqi forces and Iraqi civilians. They set off explosions in markets, mosques, and schools, hoping to kill as many people as possible.
Each of these different groups was attempting to prevent the establishment of a viable democratically elected Iraqi government by attacking American forces, the Iraqi people, and other targets, including the country’s energy infrastructure. By blowing up pipelines, for example, they hoped to create more chaos and deny Iraq the resources needed to get up and running again. This complex and adaptable enemy was determined to inflict a major strategic defeat on the United States by driving us out of Iraq and turning that country into a chaotic and violent safe haven for terror.
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THERE WERE SOME WHO had come to think that victory was impossible. Congressman Jack Murtha, a powerful Democrat from Pennsylvania, declared that we had become “a catalyst for violence” and said that it was time to bring the troops home. So did Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, who compared Iraq to Vietnam and said we could not win militarily. He drafted a proposal for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops by the end of 2006.
I felt certain we could prevail and was convinced that our national security depended upon it. During the 1980s and 1990s, we had repeatedly responded weakly or not at all, and in some cases we had retreated, in the face of attack. The terrorists had come to believe that if you killed enough Americans, you could change American policy. Weakness and retreat invited further attack.
But the course we were on wasn’t working. We were supposed to be training the Iraqi forces to stand up so that we could stand down, but the violence was increasing, most notably in Baghdad, and the Iraqis didn’t seem ready to stand on their own. When General Casey came to Washington in mid-July, having already withdrawn one brigade and with plans to take out four more before the end of the year, I was extremely doubtful. We could not simply hand off responsibility, walk away, and declare victory. We had to win first, or we risked the creation of an Iraq that would threaten the United States and our allies for years to come.
About this time Henry Kissinger visited me in my office at the White House, as he had done with some regularity since I had become vice president. Our conversation covered a range of topics, including North Korea, Russia, and Europe, but Henry began with Iraq and warned about the political dynamics of withdrawing forces. “Once you start,” he said, recalling his experiences with Vietnam, “the Democrats’ demands for more will never end.” The issue would no longer be winning, but how fast we were withdrawing. “Withdrawals are like salted peanuts,” he said. “Once you start, you can’t stop.”
During the violent summer of 2006, Iraqi and coalition forces conducted two military operations aimed at securing Baghdad.
On a video conference at Camp David, with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Rice, as we discussed a change in strategy in Iraq in the summer of 2006. (Official White House Photo/David Bohrer)
Operation Together Forward I in June and Operation Together Forward II in August, both led by Iraqi forces with coalition troops in supporting roles, aimed to clear Baghdad’s most violent