In My Time - Dick Cheney [264]
When I met President Karzai in Kabul, he expressed his gratitude for American support. He told me of the time he had spent as a refugee, living in a camp in Pakistan and traveling across the border into Afghanistan, trying to convince the tribal leaders to take on the Taliban regime. He said the one question they always asked was “Have you got the Americans with you?” He said the tribal leaders would take on the fight when they knew they could count on us to back them. He felt that President Bush’s decision to increase troop levels as well as commit close to $11 billion in additional reconstruction aid sent a very clear signal that we were with him. Karzai had his difficulties, however, some of his own making and many not.
There were several reasons for the significant challenges we faced and continue to face in Afghanistan. First, the country’s geography, history, tribal society, and extreme poverty all combine to make it a very difficult place to govern. Second, it is the largest producer of heroin in the world, single-handedly meeting the demand in Europe. The poppy industry generates cash that funds warlords and encourages corruption. Third, extreme poverty makes the task of building a sovereign, free, secure nation much more difficult in many ways than it was in Iraq, where there is more than a 100 billion–barrel oil reserve. In recent months there has been a significant discovery of mineral deposits in Afghanistan. I am hopeful that this find can someday provide the resources Afghanistan needs to thrive. Fourth, our multilateral method of operating in Afghanistan carries with it both strengths and weaknesses. We have had many courageous allies fighting alongside us, but some of the rules of engagement imposed on their forces by home governments have made it difficult to count on them in a pinch. I remember one colonel explaining to me the dismay of American troops when they called in air strikes only to have a French Mirage jet conduct the equivalent of an unarmed flyover.
It is also the case that arrangements we had agreed to in 2002 for dividing up the responsibilities for reconstruction turned out to be less effective than we had hoped. Some governments failed to follow through on their commitments, which left large segments of the reconstruction undone or underfunded.
Finally, and most important, is the problem of Pakistan. It is worth remembering that before 9/11, it was one of only three governments in the world that recognized the Taliban. Musharraf formally cut those ties, and the Pakistanis worked with us to capture some of the most important leaders in the War on Terror, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah. But a large and active extreme Islamist segment of the population was incensed by Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States, and Musharraf became an assassination target. He survived two attempts on his life within eleven days in December 2003. Within the Pakistani government, there were also some who continued to support the Taliban, which, among other things, hindered efforts to clear out the tribal areas. Al Qaeda had its sympathizers, too, as Osama bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad for some six years seems to suggest.
After my visit with Musharraf in 2007, his position grew increasingly weak. He suspended the chief justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court, which brought thousands of protestors into the streets. In November 2007, he suspended Pakistan’s constitution and declared emergency rule. He lifted it on December 15, promising to go ahead with free and fair elections. Then, on December 27, 2007, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan to lead her party in the parliamentary elections, was assassinated. The following year, Musharraf was voted out of office. He was succeeded by Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of Benazir Bhutto.
Our efforts in Afghanistan continued to be hindered by the safe haven that the Taliban and al Qaeda found in Pakistan. We ramped