In My Time - Dick Cheney [272]
For some time, there had been growing tension between the government in Moscow and President Saakashvili’s government in Tbilisi. Saakashvili, who had studied in the United States and wanted to orient Georgia toward the West, made no secret of his view that Georgia should join NATO. Putin viewed this as a direct threat to Russia inside what he considered Russia’s sphere of influence.
As we discussed these developments in National Security Council meetings in the days just after the Russian invasion, I suggested that we needed to view this as more than a question of the independence of South Ossetia or Abkhazia. This was Putin trying to reverse the trend of the last twenty years. He now had the forces and the wealth—primarily from oil—to be able to begin to re-exert Russian influence not just in Georgia, but across the “near abroad,” countries such as Moldova, Ukraine, the Baltic nations, and the former Central Asian republics. He had been quoted saying that he regarded the demise of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” which couldn’t have been further from my point of view. I viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest forward step for human liberty in the last sixty years. As I analyzed the situation, Putin wanted to turn back the clock and do whatever possible to restore Russian power and influence.
Shortly after the Russian invasion of Georgia, Poland had agreed to host missile interceptors, one part of a defense system that we had designed to stop missiles fired from the Middle East from hitting either Europe or the United States. Senior Russian military officials let the Polish government know that if it went ahead with the deployment of the missile defense system, Poland could expect to become a nuclear target. The Czechs had agreed to host the radar component of the defense system, and about the time the announcement was made, Russia cut back on oil deliveries to the Czech Republic.
I always felt in my dealings with Putin that it was important to remember his background. He was part of the Soviet KGB, and in many ways his actions as the leader of Russia reflected that. One Russian economist who used to work for Putin and then had a falling-out described it to me this way: “All authoritarian regimes have security services. But today’s Russia is really the first state where the security service has become the state.” While America and Western Europe had moved beyond the divisions of the Cold War, Putin seemed to long for them.
During my visit to Georgia, I voiced American support for Georgia’s sovereignty. I also announced that the United States would provide over $1 billion in economic and humanitarian assistance. Before returning to the United States, I attended the Ambrosetti Forum, an annual economic conference held in Italy, where I denounced Russia’s invasion of Georgia and its heavy-handed dealings with Poland and the Czech Republic. As for Georgia and Ukraine, the time had come, I said, to begin action to make them members of NATO.
I was disappointed to see the Obama administration in its early months decide to halt the missile defense project with Poland and the Czech Republic. I suspect the Russians put the same kind of pressure on them as they had put on us. I was glad to see my successor, Vice President Joe Biden, endorse the idea of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, but progress in achieving that has been disappointingly slow.
In the end, we need to make clear to the Russians and our friends and allies that we will be aggressive in expanding the borders of the free world and that the Russian government has to make a choice. It cannot continue to reap the benefits of a free world economy while simultaneously blackmailing other governments, attempting to use military force to unilaterally redraw