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In My Time - Dick Cheney [283]

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365 after their return: Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, vol. 1, Regime Strategic Intent, Realizing Saddam’s Veiled WMD Intent, September 30, 2004, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1.html#sect7.

366 for WMD development: Duelfer, Comprehensive Report, vol. 1, Regime Strategic Intent, Key Findings, September 30, 2004, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1.html#sect1.

366 his biological weapons program: Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, August 11, 2003, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2003/pr08112003.htm.

367 “the Persian Gulf region”: quoted in Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 7, 2004, p. 144, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf.

367 nuclear or nonnuclear use: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information, June 5, 2008, pp. 6–7, http://intelligence.senate.gov/080605/phase2a.pdf.

367 President George H. W. Bush: Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq: Baghdad Attempts to Assassinate Former President Bush,” July 12, 1993, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000756378/DOC_0000756378.pdf.

367 participated in terrorist attacks: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Prewar Intelligence, July 7, 2004, pp. 315–16.

368 “absent U.S. military action”: Letter from George Tenet to Bob Graham, October 7, 2002, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002, p. S10154.

368 Development officer, in Jordan: George Tenet, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 11, 2003, p. 78, http://intelligence.senate.gov/108161.pdf; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Prewar Intelligence, pp. 337 and 353; Tenet, Center of the Storm, pp. 350–54.

368 Tenet would later write: Tenet, Center of the Storm, p. 370; See also Robb-Silberman Report, p. 14.

384 than had been suspected: Robb-Silberman Report, pp. 267–70.

385 one million dying: Tara O’Toole, Mair Michael, and Thomas V. Inglesby, “Shining Light on ‘Dark Winter,’” Clinical Infectious Diseases, vol. 34, issue 7, April 1, 2002, pp. 972–83, http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/34/7/972.full#sec-2.

392 “several months to a year”: National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” October 2002, http://www.dni.gov/nic/special_keyjudgements.html. The assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research had an alternative view, judging that while Saddam was “pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapons-related capabilities,” he did not have “an integrated and comprehensive approach,” which made it impossible to predict when he could acquire a nuclear weapon.

394 “an obvious falsehood”: “Britain: Iraq Statement an ‘Obvious Falsehood,’” Associated Press, December 18, 2002.

394 within the past few years: Hans Blix, An Update on Inspection, January 27, 2003, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/Bx27.htm.

404 speech was “well-founded”: Committee of Privy Counsellors, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, July 14, 2004, pp. 123–25, http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf.

405 chief among them: Tenet, Center of the Storm, p. 469.

406 wanted to buy yellowcake: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Prewar Intelligence, pp. 43–46.

406 “a flat-out lie”: Spencer Ackerman and John B. Judis, “The First Casualty,” New Republic, June 30, 2003.

406 State of the Union speech: web chat sponsored by Kerry campaign, October 29, 2003, quoted at http://www.factcheck.org/article222.html.

407 “unsubstantiated, and misleading”: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Prewar

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