In My Time - Dick Cheney [99]
Bandar was skeptical during the first part of our meeting. He reminded us of the story of the time when the Shah of Iran was overthrown and President Jimmy Carter provided the unarmed squadron of F-15s to the Kingdom, humiliating the Saudis and leaving a bitter memory of America as an unreliable ally. “We’re serious this time,” I told Bandar.
We showed him the satellite imagery of Iraqi troops now massing near the Saudi border. Then Powell briefed him on what the United States was prepared to do to defend the Kingdom, laying out divisions, tanks, artillery, ships. “How many forces are we talking about?” Bandar asked when the brief was done. One hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand, we told him. He was taken aback, but we had convinced him we meant business. This wouldn’t be a rerun of the unarmed F-15s. I emphasized that we needed to begin deploying the force as soon as possible. We didn’t have time to wait while Saddam gathered strength and planned his next move. Bandar said he would leave that night to brief King Fahd on the plan. He said he would support the deployment and convey a sense of urgency to his king.
The president called another meeting of the NSC for Saturday, August 4, at Camp David. We met in Laurel Lodge, a gathering place built by President Nixon. The main room, overlooking the woods, has a fireplace, TV, piano, backgammon board, and bar. There is also a dining room, a small study for the president, and a conference room for larger meetings. During George H. W. Bush’s presidency, the conference table had aircraft models displayed down its center.
General Schwarzkopf briefed on Op Plan 90-1002—which forces we would use and how long it would take them to deploy. He stressed that it would be months before we had an effective force in place, which underscored a concern shared by many of us: that Saddam would move on Saudi oil fields before we had sufficient troops in place to stop him. Over the next few days, there would be several reports that Saddam was on the verge of moving across the Saudi border. Having missed Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, our intelligence analysts now seemed to see signs everywhere of his invading Saudi Arabia.
It became clear pretty quickly that if the Saudis didn’t agree to accept U.S. forces, we had few options. Israel would likely have accepted our troops, but we couldn’t launch military action against an Arab country from Israeli territory. Turkey was another option, with the large U.S. base at Incirlik, but the distances involved would have provided real logistical challenges. We got word while we were at Camp David that the Saudis were uncomfortable with the idea of U.S. forces in the Kingdom. As our meeting broke up, President Bush got on the phone to speak directly to King Fahd.
Several hours later, I was back at home in McLean when Scowcroft called to say we needed to send a team to brief the Saudis on the possible troop deployment. Scowcroft said he would lead the team and planned to take General Powell with him. “Brent, I want to lead that team,” I told him. “The deployment of forces is my responsibility, and I ought to be the one to lead it.” “Okay,” Scowcroft said. “I’ll take that to the president.” As national security advisor, Scowcroft was an honest broker. I knew that even though he may have wanted to lead the trip himself, he would faithfully carry my request to the president. He called back awhile later to say the president agreed. I should lead the team.
I also had concerns about Powell’s participating as the senior military official. He had been hesitant in discussions of military options, and we needed to convince the Saudis to accept troops—and accept them now. I wasn’t sure