In the Buddha's Words - Bhikkhu Bodhi [162]
A detailed catechism on the aggregates, treating them from diverse angles, can be found in Text IX,4(1) (b). Because the five aggregates that make up our ordinary experience are the objective domain of clinging (upādāna), they are commonly called the five aggregates subject to clinging (pañc’upādānakkhandhā). Clinging to the five aggregates occurs in two principal modes, which we might call appropriation and identification. One either grasps them and takes possession of them, that is, one appropriates them; or one uses them as the basis for views about one’s self or for conceit (“I am better than, as good as, inferior to others”), that is, one identifies with them. As the Nikāyas put it, we are prone to think of the aggregates thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self” (etaṃ mama, eso ’ham asmi, eso me attā). In this phrase, the notion “This is mine” represents the act of appropriation, a function of craving (taṇhā). The notions “This I am” and “This is my self” represent two types of identification, the former expressing conceit (māna), the latter views (diṭṭhi).3
The Five Aggregates (based on SN 22:56–57 and 22:95)
Giving up craving is so difficult because craving is reinforced by views, which rationalize our identification with the aggregates and thus equip craving with a protective shield. The type of view that lies at the bottom of all affirmation of selfhood is called identity view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi). The suttas often mention twenty types of identity view, obtained by considering one’s self to stand in any of four relations to each of the five aggregates: either as identical with it, as possessing it, as containing it, or as contained within it. The “uninstructed worldling” holds some kind of identity view; “the instructed noble disciple,” having seen with wisdom the selfless nature of the aggregates, no longer regards the aggregates as a self or the belongings of a self. Adopting any of these views is a cause of anxiety and distress. It is also a leash that keeps us bound to the round of rebirths—see above, Text I,2(3) and Text I,4(5).
All the defilements ultimately stem from ignorance, which thus lies at the bottom of all suffering and bondage. Ignorance weaves a net of three delusions around the aggregates. These delusions are the notions that the five aggregates are permanent, a source of true happiness, and a self. The wisdom needed to break the spell of these delusions is the insight into the five aggregates as impermanent (anicca), suffering (dukkha), and nonself (anattā). This is called the direct knowledge of the three characteristics of existence (tilakkhaṇa).
Some suttas seem to make insight into one or another of the three characteristics alone sufficient for reaching the goal. However, the three characteristics are closely interwoven, and thus the most common formula found in the Nikāyas builds upon their internal relationship. First enunciated in the Buddha’s second discourse at Bārāṇasī—Text IX,4(1)(c)—the formula uses the characteristic of impermanence to reveal the characteristic of suffering, and both together to reveal the characteristic of nonself. The suttas take this indirect route to the characteristic of nonself because the selfless nature of things is so subtle that often it cannot be seen except when pointed to by the other two characteristics. When we recognize that the things we identify as our self are impermanent and bound up with suffering, we realize that they lack the essential marks of authentic selfhood and we thereby stop identifying with them.
The different expositions of the three characteristics all thus eventually converge on the eradication of clinging. They do so by showing, with regard to each aggregate, “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.” This makes the insight into nonself the culmination and consummation of the contemplation of the three characteristics. While the characteristic