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An end to the anti-Syrian rhetoric coming from the White House and the State Department since 2003. That would automatically reduce the anti-Syrian sentiment in the US media.

Recognition of Syria’s cooperation with Iraq on border security.

Cooperation with Syria to deal with the 1.5 million Iraqi refugees in Syria.

The lifting—in due course—of the sanctions that were imposed on Damascus.

The abolition of the SAA.

Willingness to sponsor Syria’s indirect peace talks with Israel, currently on hold in Turkey. That was something Bush curtly refused to do since the talks started in April 2008; he claimed that Syria was more interested in a peace process than a peace treaty. Syria is sincere, and the new White House must acknowledge that to deliver peaceful results in the Middle East. The United States’s willingness to serve as an honest broker could make the talks successful, the Syrians believe. Its participation could transform the talks from indirect to direct negotiations. Syria is determined to regain the occupied Golan Heights (taken by Israel during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967), and Obama must help Syria achieve that if he is sincere about change in the region.

Recognition that no problems can be solved in the Middle East without Syria with regard to the Palestinians, Iraqis, and Lebanese. Bush launched his famous “roadmap” for peace between Israel and Palestine, but he bypassed the Syrians. If another roadmap were to be launched, Syria would have to be included.

Help Syria combat Islamic fundamentalism, which has been flowing into its territory from north Lebanon and Iraq.

An apology, compensation, and explanation for the air raid on Syria that left eight Syrian civilians dead in October 2008.

Help normalize relations between Syria and America on a people-to-people level, which have been strained since 2001 when Bush came to power. That would include giving visas to Syrians wanting to study or work in the United States.

From Damascus and the region, Syria’s “triumphalism” must have seemed justified.7 The Assad regime had outlasted not only the Bush administration’s isolation and confrontation policy but also the administration itself. However, to accomplish this, the Assad regime had concocted an eclectic and potentially volatile mixture of policies. To fight the United States and its allies in Iraq, Damascus allowed al-Qaeda–affiliated foreign-fighter networks to cross its territory into Iraq, where they were responsible for some of the conflict’s most spectacular attacks. This policy undermined the notion I and others had entertained following the September 11 attacks that a minority-led Alawite regime would never allow its territory to be used by Sunni extremists like al-Qaeda. That action plus the regime’s domestic outreach to Islam increased Assad’s domestic legitimacy at the expense of weakening the secular regime his father, Hafez, had built. He also continued the repressive aspects of his father’s rule by arresting regime opponents and perpetuating horrific human rights abuses. In Lebanon, Damascus had deepened its ties with Hezbollah to historic levels to contain the March 14 coalition, including frequent public meetings between President Assad and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, a man that Bashar’s father had always held at arm’s length. To cement this relationship, Assad brought his country into a closer orbit with Iran, forming the “resistance axis” of countries allied against US and Israeli interests in the region. Last but not least, Assad appeared to have started a nuclear program, either as a deterrent against Israel or as part of a second Iranian nuclear program or, perhaps, both.

While the Assad regime might have survived the worst that the Bush administration would throw at it, the things the regime had to do to survive made reconciliation with the United States even more difficult, and the high-level engagement Damascus had hoped for didn’t materialize. An expectations gap rapidly grew between