In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [116]
Instead of immediately implementing the measures by presidential decree—which he could easily do under Syria’s presidential system—he chose to push responsibility for the decision into various committees ahead of a “National Dialogue” that he vaguely said would roll out sometime in the next two months.
All the measures Assad outlined had been under consideration by the regime for years, so it was unclear how much discussion would be required for passage, other than that of Assad’s willingness to sign the measures into law. In addressing the issue of why reform in Syria has been so slow, Assad said there was “no reason”—a reference to his speech on March 30 in which he dismissed the notion that a group of hard-line or old-guard figures were holding him back. Finally, Assad indicated that Syria’s parliamentary elections, which were originally set for August, might be rescheduled before the end of 2011.16
As Washington officials struggled to come up with a further policy response to the Syrian uprising, it was clear that any strategy they chose going forward had to cut through the ambiguity and duplicity that was the hallmark of Bashar al-Assad’s reign. In speeches on March 30 and June 20, he blamed the unrest sweeping his country on foreign “conspiracies” and refused to announce any specific reforms, indicating that he was not about to change his ways—at least not without a push from the outside.17
Assad had spent the last eleven years promising political “reform,” but he had never delivered on the promise. This pattern is a well-established one. He talks about peace with Israel and at the same time sends Scud missiles to Hezbollah. He promises to keep his hands off Lebanon but worked with Hezbollah to bring down the government in Beirut. He says that as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty he wants a nuclear-free Middle East, but he stonewalls International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors investigating the rubble of his North Korean–designed nuclear program.
Until the uprising, the Obama administration had engaged Assad with the primary goal of restarting peace talks between Syria and Israel while trying to mitigate the regional damage from Syria’s worsening policies. Washington has attempted to test Assad’s intention and ability to reorient his country away from Iran and toward the West in Syria-Israel peace talks by putting him on the horns of a dilemma: Either you get back the Golan Heights, or you keep supporting Hezbollah—but not both. Those well-intentioned efforts failed to break the gridlock. Israel watched Assad’s transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, doubted his peaceful intentions, and refused to make the risky political decision to rejoin talks. With Washington unable to deliver Israel to the negotiating table, Assad was not compelled to show his hand.
The Obama administration was right to use dilemmas as a negotiating strategy; a dilemma can force a clear choice and reveal the other side’s character and intentions. But the dilemma has to fit the context. Assad, who repeatedly attributed the unrest to Israeli and American meddling, has lost significant public support by using live fire on protesters, and he is not likely to risk further alienating his supporters by signing on the dotted line with Israel—at least anytime soon.
Dilemmas also only work if they are set up properly. The Obama administration tried to conduct its test by talking behind closed doors with Assad about peace with Israel and his destructive policies while keeping US sanctions in place. But it had not introduced new negative incentives in response to Assad’s regional meddling and hardhanded tactics that diametrically oppose US interests or values. And Assad had little fear that Washington would, especially when US officials made his case for him by repeatedly emphasizing