In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [118]
In terms of regional dilemmas, perhaps the most intriguing—and the one with deep implications for the Syrian-Iranian alliance in the short term—remained the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) investigation into the 2005 murder of Rafik Hariri. On June 30, 2011, the tribunal indicted a number of members of Hezbollah for the murder operation itself based on forensic and communications evidence. While the Assad regime must have breathed a collective sigh of relief for being spared, the indictments of Hezbollah members placed the Assad regime in an awkward position—especially following a diplomatic effort by Saudi Arabia in 2010 to reconcile Assad and the former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri and a simultaneous attempt by Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah to shift blame for Hariri’s assassination to Israel. Would Syria back Hezbollah as indictments were issued? Would Syria support a Hezbollah attempt to cut off Lebanon’s 51-percent share of funding for the tribunal?
The second dilemma involved the IAEA investigation into Syria’s nuclear program. As Syria continued to deny all access to the Al Kibar site, the IAEA and the Obama administration considered issuing a “special inspection” of suspected Syrian nuclear sites.18 The urgency had less to do with the Syrian program—by all accounts whatever was going on at Al Kibar was destroyed by Israeli aircraft—than with what kind of example Syria’s case held out to other would-be nuclear proliferators looking to buck the international nonproliferation regime. If the special inspection were ordered, Syria faced referral to the Security Council and possible UN sanctions. Would the Assad regime come clean on its activities in the face of a showdown with the IAEA that threatened the international community’s courting of the Assad regime? Or would it attempt to deflect pressure from the international community by reducing its demands for entering into peace talks with Israel?
The third dilemma involved the Assad regime’s economics. With oil revenue declining as a percentage of government revenue and waves of young Syrians hitting the job market every year, the Assad regime faced increasingly stark choices. While it could continue its alliance with Hezbollah and Iran against Israel, it would have a hard time maintaining its war footing and the corruption it generates while attracting the kind of foreign investment necessary for job creation. The deep economic problems these policies produce for the Assad regime’s finances presented the Obama administration with what would seem ample leverage through easing or tightening US sanctions.
But in the end, the hardest part for Washington will be reading Assad’s response. For if there is one thing I learned from my engagement with Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, it’s that there are at least three answers for every question—yes, no, and no response. In the words of a good friend, “The Assad regime cannot exist in a world of black or white—only shades of gray.”
NOTES
1. THE ARAB WORLD’S TWILIGHT ZONE
1. “The American–Syrian Crisis and the End of Constructive Engagement,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 4, April 2003.
2. Member of US embassy staff in Damascus, Syria, interview with the author, July 2008.
3. “Background Note: Syria,” US State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, March 18, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm.
4. Former ambassador to Syria Edward Djerejian, interview with the author, April 2008.
5. The embargo included all countries designated as US state sponsors of international terrorism under the “Embargoed Countries,” US Department of State, Directorate of Defence Trade Controls, 56 FR 55630, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/docs/frnotices/56FR55630.PDF.
6. Following its addition to the state sponsor of terrorism list in 1993, Sudan remains the