In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [16]
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THE GREAT UNRAVELING
Almost a year to the day after the launch of OBG’s Syria report, I was back in Damascus working on another one. As I entered my rented apartment in East Mezze, a few blocks from the SEBC, the air was so cold that I could see my breath. I threw the switch to the apartment’s boiler, which let out a roar as it ignited ten seconds later. The apartment filled with the smell of diesel—the cheap subsidized fuel Syrians use for everything, from heating their homes to keeping irrigation pumps running.
I turned on the television and cranked the volume up to drown out the boiler’s drone. Secretary of state Colin Powell was beginning a presentation to the UN Security Council concerning allegations that Iraq was attempting to conceal its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program from UN inspectors. His slide presentation, entitled “Failure to Disarm,” was peppered with English translations of Iraqi radio transmissions that helped make Washington’s case. In one transcript, an Iraqi officer said, “Nerve agents. Stop talking about it. They are listening to us. Don’t give any evidence that we have these horrible agents.” Another showed computer animations of “mobile labs”—rail-car and truck-sized trailer facilities that US intelligence claimed could produce as much biological agent in one month as the whole of Iraq had produced in “all the years prior to the Gulf War.” I knew that Iraq had no missiles or planes that could deliver such agents to Europe or the United States. But they could make their way into the hands of terrorist groups set on America’s destruction. For the first time in my life, I thought about the possibility of an anthrax attack on my hometown near Pittsburgh.
While Powell didn’t prove any of his claims, he did demonstrate that Iraq was attempting to conceal something regarding a biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons program.1 This was in violation of Security Council Resolution 1441, a measure passed the previous November that declared Baghdad in “material breach” of its disarmament obligations following the 1990–1991 Gulf War and gave Baghdad “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.”2 Powell’s presentation was the Bush administration’s opening diplomatic salvo to try to pass another UN resolution giving international legal justification for the use of military force against Saddam Hussein’s regime.
From afar, Damascus’s reactions to Washington’s plans might have seemed mixed. Syria voted in favor of 1441, allowing the resolution to be adopted unanimously and giving it a wider range of support than had been achieved leading up to the US-led liberation of Kuwait in the 1990–1991 Gulf War.3 Powell’s presentation seemed to change Syria’s tune, however. In prepared remarks, Syria’s representative to the UN, Mikhail Wehbe, read a statement by the Syrian foreign minister, Farouk al-Shara, implying a new resolution was not needed.4
In the weeks that followed, there were signs that perhaps Washington and Damascus were still working together behind the scenes. Syria ordered the withdrawal of around four thousand troops from Lebanon. Damascus threw all its troop- and tank-transport trucks onto the Damascus-Beirut highway at the same time, jamming the road and raising the redeployment’s profile.
From my office in Damascus, however, it was clear that relations between Syria and the West were worsening. The euphoria surrounding Assad’s promised reforms had vanished, as scores of new legislative initiatives remained unimplemented. Many held Syria’s “new guard” reformers responsible, as well as the EU and UN projects designed to assist them. The pressure was so strong on many reformers that they wouldn’t even meet with me.
The Ministry of Information was less friendly as well. It limited the duration of my visa from six months to three, giving the government