In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [21]
Shortly after my meeting with Asma, US policy toward Syria began to change. On March 3, 2003, Secretary of State Powell declared in a speech before Congress that it was the objective of the United States to “let Lebanon be ruled by the Lebanese people without the presence of the Syrian occupation army.”7 Since Washington’s tacit “deal” with Assad over Lebanon in the autumn of 1990, Powell’s words marked the first time that a US official referred to Syria’s “presence” in Lebanon as an occupation.
On March 17, Powell withdrew a draft resolution from the UN Security Council, which had called for the use of military force to compel Saddam Hussein to disarm. Washington announced that existing resolutions were enough to justify the use of military force in Iraq. War was coming fast, so I hurriedly cleaned out my Damascus apartment and prepared to fly the following morning to OBG’s other project, which was located in Tunis. Most Syrians I knew warned me that during the Gulf War, international telephone lines and other communications with Syria were disconnected for over a week—which was time I could not afford to be cut off from OBG while it was going through frantic regional expansion.
I stopped by to see Rola. I wanted to tell her about my early departure and thank her for all her help. After a few minutes of small talk, she suddenly surprised me by saying that she had been talking with Bouthaina Shaaban about ways to improve Syria’s image. She was referring to the spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—a former translator for Hafez al-Assad. “We’d like to hear your ideas on how to do that. Once the war is over, come to Damascus and we will talk about it.”
Before leaving Damascus, I stopped by the US embassy to say good-bye to a few friends. The thoroughfare in front of the embassy, normally filled with cars, was jammed with people, queuing in front of the Iraqi embassy. Buses were parked nearby, with scores of Syrian youths sitting inside. When I finally made it into the chancery, a friend pointed out of the window toward the Iraqi embassy. “They say they are volunteering to go fight us in Iraq,” he said, eyebrows raised.
In Tunis, I returned to the chaos of OBG’s global expansion. From my hotel room, I followed the story of US troops invading Iraq via CNN. Reports from journalists and camera crews embedded within US troop units dominated the news coverage, which eclipsed Syria’s response to the invasion. The Tunisian government’s restrictions on the Internet made checking the news difficult. I was also suffering from a sort of “burnout” regarding Syria that OBG staff often experienced immediately after a report. However, from what I could see, US-Syrian relations seemed to be taking a turn for the worst.
Syria’s response to the invasion was defiance. Volunteers to wage “jihad” against occupation forces continued to gather in front of the US embassy in Damascus. When Washington protested diplomatically, the gathering point was moved to the old Damascus International Fairgrounds.
On March 27, Assad officially confirmed Syria’s support for resistance against US forces in Iraq. In an interview with Lebanon’s As-Safir newspaper, Assad said that “if the American-British designs succeed—and we hope they do not succeed … there will be Arab popular resistance.”8
Later the same day, Syria’s grand mufti, the elderly Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro, called on “Muslims everywhere to use all means possible to thwart the aggression, including martyr operations against American, British and Zionist invaders…. Resistance to the belligerent invaders is an obligation for all Muslims.”9 A few days later, Syrian foreign minister Farouk al-Shara announced before the Syrian parliament