In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [28]
With Syria Today‘s plan in place, Leila and I were optimistic that the first lady’s efforts would push reform forward in Syria. For Leila, the first lady was a role model for what a woman could aspire to in Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. As for me, while US sanctions seemed to be on the way, US-Syrian trade was so small that some of the sanctions’ proposed measures, including a trade or investment ban, seemed to have little threat. Consultancy and journalism—my professional fields—would be unaffected by the sanctions. So I decided to stay the year in Damascus with Leila and take my chances. The only way was up.
On December 11, 2003, President Bush signed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SAA) into law. The bill demanded that Damascus “halt Syrian support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, stop its development of weapons of mass destruction, [and] cease its illegal importation of Iraqi oil and illegal shipments of weapons and other military items to Iraq.” The text added that Syria “will be held responsible for attacks committed by Hezbollah and other terrorist groups with offices or other facilities in Syria.” Under the SAA, the president was required to choose at least two of six outlined penalties within six months of the bill’s signature. The options included a reduction of diplomatic relations with Syria, a ban on US exports to Syria, a US investment ban, a restriction on Syrian diplomats within twenty-five miles of Washington and the United Nations, a ban on Syrian flights to the United States, and a freeze on Syrian assets under American jurisdiction.2
In a public statement, Bush said the bill was “intended to strengthen the ability of the United States to conduct an effective foreign policy,” but there were tensions surrounding the decision as well. Under the American constitution, foreign policy is the domain of the executive branch. Bush’s statement added that “a law cannot burden or infringe the president’s exercise of a core constitutional power by attaching conditions precedent to the use of that power.” Just like his predecessors, Bush didn’t want his hands tied when dealing with Damascus. In response, Syria’s state news agency blamed the law’s passage on “the partisans of Israel in the American Congress … who want more than anything for Syria to end its support for the resistance of the Palestinian people.”3
At MAWRED, no one even noticed—the staff was busily preparing for Mrs. Assad’s official opening of MAWRED’s business incubator on December 13. Until then, the incubator, which consisted of three offices in a corner of the SEBC’s ground floor, operated “unofficially” as a “pilot project.” In the days leading up to the opening, Rola rallied the NGO’s staff to finish the organization’s website and tape up some posters on the walls. The key person on this was Dunya Istanbuli, a Syrian-American SEBC analyst whom I had met in 2001. She was now the daughter-in-law of a senior Syrian military officer. Dunya and I worked marathon sessions editing and rewriting