In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [53]
Shaaban’s statements continued, broad and vague. A new parties law would be issued, but it would be based on “national unity” and would not permit parties based on religion, sect, or ethnicity. Article 8 of the constitution, which says the Baath Party leads the state, was not touched. The emergency law—in place since the Baath Party took power in 1963 (and installed Hafez al-Assad, then a military attaché at Syria’s embassy in Argentina, as chairman of a national council)—would be reviewed with the idea of limiting certain issues to “state security.” Also under review would be the fact that the Kurds in the country were not citizens; thus most of their rights would be granted.
Concerning the party’s powerful “regional command,” the positions of prime minister and speaker of parliament would be held by party members. In the past, only individuals were appointed to the regional command. This, Shaaban said, would “enhance relations between the party and the government.” The Higher Media Council would be established to help “correct Syria’s distorted image” abroad. Last but not least, Shaaban said the president was pleased with the conference’s outcome.
Her statements lasted a mere ten minutes. She entertained a few questions from reporters, to which she provided vague answers or said that they would be outlined at a later time. And that was it. I sighed in disgust, switched off the TV, and went to bed. They don’t want to be understood, I thought.
Shaaban’s slogan of “flexibility and steadfastness” in many ways was the correct way to describe the Tenth Baath Party Conference. The Baath Party was not making a great leap forward, as the president seemed to indicate on the eve of Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, but was rather simply stretching its boundaries a bit. Since Article 8 of the constitution had not been touched, and whatever political project that was on the way would not be permitted along sectarian, ethnic, or religious lines, the party was standing fast to its principle that Syrians are first and foremost Arabs and would therefore manage things politically as such as long as the Assad regime was in power.
The dreaded emergency law—which justifies anything the state wants to do, including detaining Syrians without charge—would be reviewed, but many questions remained about what “national security” meant in today’s Syria. The definition of “national security” would still remain in the hands of the leadership. Syria’s media sector would continue to be opened up, but all in the name of improving the country’s image. Could such a formula really cultivate a properly functioning fourth estate? Making the prime minister and speaker of parliament members of the regional command seemed significant—or did this move simply guarantee the Baath Party’s hold over the state, even in the event of having an independent prime minister, which was something that has been promised for years?
This was strange behavior for a regime under intense international pressure, which always complained that it was misunderstood. Although perhaps it was not so odd after all, given the situation in Syria. The most important outcome of the conference—the retirement of major political figures—was not emphasized in any way by the regime and in turn was ignored by the Syrian and foreign media.
In many ways, the conference signaled the end of a five-year transition period for the Baath Party, marked by a struggle between the old guard of the late president Hafez al-Assad (commonly referred to as “Bashar’s uncles”) and the “new generation” of the current president. During the transition, the old guard was blamed for hindering President Bashar’s reform efforts, largely through “loyalist networks” that had been formed throughout the senior Assad’s three decades in power. These figures included two vice presidents, Abdel Halim Khaddam and Muhammad Zuheir Masharqa; two longtime regional-command members, Abdullah al-Ahmar and Suleiman Qaddah;