In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [57]
Concerning Syria Today, we decided to go ahead with our coverage of the Hariri investigation but also to push red lines to see where things stood. In December 2005, Syria Today‘s cover story, “When Exception Becomes the Rule,” probed Syria’s use of security courts to try civilians and examined the Hariri evidence in detail. To our surprise, the edition came back from censorship approved. We were relieved, not only for the edition’s clearance, but because in the days leading up to the magazine’s publication, rumors had spread throughout the Syrian capital that our former patron, Asma al-Assad, had fled to London to live with her family. Her NGOs remained open, but reports from friends said that no one was showing up for work.
On December 15, 2005, the Security Council met to discuss Mehlis’s findings since his first report. After extensive deliberation, they passed Resolution 1644, which demanded that Syria respond “unambiguously and immediately” to the commission investigating the terrorist attack that had killed former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, and they extended the investigation another six months. The resolution also demanded that Syria implement “without delay” any future request of the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission. The resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, meaning Syrian noncompliance would be a “threat to peace,” allowing the United Nations to use sanctions or military force to enforce the measure.17
As 2005 drew to a close, many predicted that the Assad regime would soon fall. On December 30, former vice president Abdel Halim Khaddam gave a lengthy interview on the Saudi-owned pan-Arab satellite television station Al Arabiya. He said that Assad’s advisers were putting the country on the path to ruin, forcing Khaddam to choose between the regime and his country. He did not directly criticize Assad, but descriptions of how easily he had been duped by the former Syrian security chief in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh, and Farouk al-Shara made the president appear naïve.
While Khaddam had polite words for the president, his comments on the Hariri assassination grabbed international headlines. He said that if Hariri’s murder was carried out by Syrian intelligence, “they would not make such a decision alone … this is not possible”—indicating Assad would have certainly known about the murder. Khaddam added that Assad had threatened Hariri during their last meeting in Damascus. Khaddam said that he and other Syrian officials heard Assad say “very, very, very hard” things to Hariri and that “he will crush anyone who tries to get out of our decision. I cannot recall the exact words. But they were very harsh words.”18
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THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND
For ten days after Mehlis announced his findings, the presidential palace in Damascus was silent. Rumors spread throughout the Syrian capital that President Assad had suffered a nervous breakdown, as Syria now faced even greater diplomatic isolation and the specter of UN sanctions should the regime fail to comply with the investigation. Many in Damascus talked of a possible palace coup, in which Bashar would be replaced by his brother Maher or his brother-in-law, chief of military intelligence Assef Shawkat—both names in the tracked changes of Mehlis’s first report. Others predicted that Assad would try and build up popular support by implementing the reforms promised at the Baath Party conference, most notably a new political parties law.
At 7 AM on November 10, a mobile-phone text message—sent in Arabic and English to all subscribers of Syriatel, the mobile network owned by Assad’s cousin and business tycoon Rami Makhlouf—broke the silence. It asked Syrians to attend a rally that day near Damascus University demonstrating “love of country and the rejection of external pressures.” By midday, thousands gathered out in front of the main hall of