In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [72]
As much as Kilo was critical of the Assad regime, he was equally critical of the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Kilo insisted that the opposition could not work according to “an American understanding” but “our own understanding” and that Washington’s intentions were to “Americanize the region,” not democratize it. “We want to discuss Arab unity and that we will not accept doing nothing about the Palestinians.”
When I asked him if he would have thought differently had the US occupation of Iraq not broken out into sectarian warfare, Kilo nearly leapt out of his seat. “Of course! There is no democracy without a state.”
Last but not least, Kilo rejected accepting any money from the Bush administration for Damascus Declaration members. “No one will enter the Damascus Declaration if they take money from the US administration.” As Kilo shook my hand cordially in farewell, I wondered what his next move might be.
On May 12, Kilo helped engineer the Beirut-Damascus/Damascus-Beirut Declaration, another manifesto urging Syria and Lebanon to establish full diplomatic relations between the two countries and demarcate the long ill-defined Syrian-Lebanese frontier. Two days later, Syrian security forces arrested Kilo at his home.5 The Security Council reiterated these demands on May 17 in Resolution 1680, which called on Damascus to demarcate the Syrian-Lebanese frontier—a key element in ending the dispute between Syria, Lebanon, and Israel over the territorial status of the Shebaa Farms—on which Hezbollah legitimizes the retention of its weapons. Anwar al-Bunni, an opposition figure working with Kilo and head of a closed EU-supported civil-society center, was arrested the same day. The next day, Washington issued Executive Order 13399, freezing assets of “anyone involved in the Hariri murder” and subsequent bombings in Lebanon.
6
NO VOICE LOUDER THAN THE CRY OF BATTLE
A little after 8 am on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fighters fired katusha rockets from Lebanon into Israel. Simultaneously, a squad of Hezbollah fighters crossed the “blue line” from Lebanon to Israel to attack two Israeli Humvees patrolling the frontier near the town of Zar’it. Three Israelis soldiers were killed, and two were wounded and were taken by Hezbollah back over the frontier into Lebanon. Following a failed rescue attempt, Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert declared the soldiers’ capture an “act of war” and ordered the Israeli air force to begin striking targets throughout Lebanon. The war between Israel and Hezbollah that analysts had been predicting for half a decade had finally broken out.
People across the Syrian capital crowded around television sets and tuned in their radios to get the latest news. After three days of bombing, Al Jazeera television reported that Israel had bombed a Syrian military installation near the Lebanese-Syrian frontier. In Damascus, people openly speculated whether Syria’s old enemy, Israel, was approaching the gates.
“Did you see the report?” Leila asked me as soon as I answered her call on my mobile. I could sense from the tone of her voice that she was panicking. “Do you think they will hit us as well?” she asked.
I didn’t know what to say. Syrians and Lebanese are socially and economically joined at the hip, but following the forced withdrawal of the Syrian Army from Lebanon in April 2005, formal political relations were more distinct than at any time in the last thirty years. When it came to a Hezbollah attack on Israel, however, it all came down to what Israel considered to be the “return address.” Given Hezbollah’s strong support from both Damascus and Tehran, it was anyone’s guess who Israel would hold responsible—and when.
It wasn’t clear that Assad knew the answer either. Syria’s state-dominated media reported the Israeli attacks