In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [81]
Bush blamed the Iranian and Syrian regimes for allowing “terrorists and insurgents” to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. In a stark warning to both countries, Bush announced that US forces would “interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria” and “destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.” Framing Iraq in ominous terms, Bush described the conflict there as part of “the decisive ideological struggle of our time.” He portrayed the struggle as one between “those who believe in freedom and moderation” and “extremists who kill the innocent and have declared their intention to destroy our way of life.” The best way to protect the American people was to “provide a hopeful alternative to the hateful ideology of the enemy by advancing liberty across a troubled region.”
In concluding the speech, Bush struck a firm but conciliatory line with his critics from the Democratic Party. He said, “It is fair to hold our views up to scrutiny” but that “all involved have the responsibility to explain how the path they propose would be more likely to succeed.” In a rhetorical jab intended for those advocating a quick withdrawal from Iraq, Bush went on: “It can be tempting to think that America can put aside the burdens of freedom,” but “throughout our history, Americans have always defied the pessimists and seen our faith in freedom redeemed.”
In Damascus, Syrians close to the regime were triumphant about what they viewed as their victory over Bush’s attempt to transform the region. One analyst told me in an interview that the United States was now in a “trap of its own making” in Iraq and predicted that it would withdraw soon. While such bravado was standard in Damascus, for the first time in nearly two years, the United States was listening to what Syrians had to say.
In the final days of the 2006 Lebanon War, Washington replaced its top diplomat, Stephen Seche, with Michael Corbin, a seasoned diplomat who previously served in the US embassy in Cairo. Almost immediately after his arrival in August, Corbin began reaching out to Syrian businessmen and media figures, holding small gatherings at his residence in West Mezze. During the Muslim month of Ramadan in October, the embassy hosted an iftar (the breaking of the fast) celebration attended by Damascus’s rich and famous. The US Cultural Center in Damascus also began reaching out as well.
This was a far cry from the depths of Washington’s isolation of Syria the year before, when the embassy refused to hold even a Fourth of July celebration. Some said that it was because the embassy feared regime pressure would keep Syrians from showing up, but more than one person had pointed out the irony of how a US administration pushing “liberty” in Syria was incapable of celebrating its own—if for no one else than other foreign diplomats.
Damascus’s early response to these overtures did not bode well for the prospects of US engagement with Syria. On September 12, 2007, a group of militants attacked the US embassy in Damascus, wounding fourteen. Washington expressed appreciation for efforts by Syrian security guards to stop the attackers; following the incident, however, the Syrian government refused to share any intelligence gathered from the attackers.
In late November, the regime ordered the closure of the Damascus offices of AMIDEAST, an American nongovernmental association dedicated to fostering better communication and educational links with the Arab world. What made this particularly ironic was that the president and CEO of AMIDEAST was Theodore Kattouf, an American of Lebanese origin and former ambassador to Syria during the early days of the Bush administration who was known for his criticism of Washington’s isolation policy. The Syrian regime also stopped cooperating with the embassy’s Fulbright program, which had sent scores of Syrian students to the United States over the years to study in a variety