In the Lion's Den_ An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle With Syria - Andrew Tabler [93]
Despite the fact that Washington tightened sanctions in 2004, the waiver for aircraft parts was still in effect. However, as relations worsened, export-license applications were increasingly rejected. The Bush administration had adopted a hard line on the interpretation of the waiver, which allowed exports only for “safety of flight.”
By the summer of 2007, Syrian Air had only six commercial jets remaining, which caused chaos for passengers traveling abroad. On a holiday trip to Milan, for example, I was unable to secure a confirmation for the flight, despite the fact that I had a ticket and a reservation to travel. Once onboard the aircraft, I saw that Bashar’s “reforms” had not made it to Syrian Air. Most of the material on the seat cushions was threadbare, and the stuffing inside most seats was lumpy and uncomfortable. The trays used to serve food were crude and clearly not intended for use on an aircraft. Upon return, I was once again unable to secure a reservation, so I was forced to show up several hours early for the flight. Luckily I was able to make it, but scores of passengers—many of whom were Italian tourists—were left angry and stranded.
A few days after the meltdown, Syrian prime minister Muhammad Naji al-Otari—under intense criticism for the outages—blamed it on US sanctions. This contravened the Assad regime’s public line that US sanctions had little or no impact on the country. According to Otari, as well as the deputy prime minister for economic affairs Abdullah Dardari, US sanctions had scared away the world’s top five powerplant manufacturers, thus causing a lack of generating capacity when demand skyrocketed during the heat wave. Syria was also forced to cut electricity exports to Iraqi Kurdistan and Lebanon, robbing itself of revenue and influence there.
At Syria Today, the staff didn’t buy Otari’s explanation. While the prime minister’s explanation possibly explained problems in generation, the failures they had witnessed in the Free Zone a few days earlier were due to transmission and grid problems. Othaina, working with a foreign freelance journalist, came up with the best quote to summarize Syria’s feeling on the meltdown: “The main problem for Syria is a total lack of planning for the future. Sanctions may be having an effect, but bad governance is the main factor, and we’re seeing none of our officials being held accountable for their mistakes.”20
Damascus in August is like Washington, DC: it’s hot, humid, and not much happens as people enjoy their summer vacation. While the electricity blackouts continued in some parts of the country, the much-hoped-for rapprochement between the United States and Syria not only failed to materialize, but this new “Cold War” began to affect relations between everyday Syrians and Americans.
The Syrian Ministry of Higher Education had failed to grant visas and residency permits to American teachers of the Damascus Community School (DCS). Known as the “American School,” DCS had been established in the 1950s with the help of former secretary of state John Foster Dulles. Unlike American schools elsewhere in the Middle East, the Syrian government didn’t grant DCS a formal license but allowed it to operate nevertheless. Over four decades, DCS educated the children of the Syrian elite who were destined for universities in America and elsewhere.
Instead of dealing with Syria’s perceived eagerness to engage diplomatically with the United States, America’s chief diplomat in Damascus, chargé d’affaires Michael Corbin, ended up spending the month of August negotiating with the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to get the teachers’ visas granted. With only a few days to go before the September start of the school year, Minister of Foreign Affairs Moallem intervened to allow the teachers