Inferno - Max Hastings [129]
In the absence of Pearl Harbor, it remains highly speculative when, if ever, the United States would have fought. In John Morton Blum’s words, “The war was neither a threat nor a crusade. It seemed, as Fortune put it, ‘only a painful necessity’ … Within the United States, Americans never saw the enemy. The nation did not share or want to share in the disasters that visited Europe and Asia.” For all the exuberant declarations of patriotism that followed the “Day of Infamy,” many Americans remained resentful about the need to accept even a modest share of the privations thrust upon most of the world’s peoples. Early in 1942, Arthur Schlesinger visited the Midwest on a tour of army bases for the Office of War Information: “We arrived in the midst of the whining about gas rationing, and it was pretty depressing. The anti-administration feeling is strong and open.”
Fortunately for the Allied cause, however, the leadership of the United States showed itself in this supreme crisis both strong and wise. At Roosevelt’s Washington summit with Churchill at the end of December 1941, the United States confirmed its provisional commitment, made during earlier staff talks, to prioritise war with Germany. Since 1939, American military and naval preparations—notably Plan Orange, eventually translated into Rainbow 5—had assumed the likelihood of a two-front struggle. The army correctly judged that this could not be won “primarily by naval action”; that the creation and deployment overseas of large land forces would be indispensable. Adm. Harold Stark wrote to the secretary of the navy on 12 November 1940: “Alone, the British Empire lacks the manpower and the material means to master Germany. Assistance by powerful allies is necessary both with respect to men and with respect to munitions and supplies.” Stark anticipated the likelihood that, if the Japanese struck, the British would lose Malaya. He proposed a blockade of Japan, to which its absolute dependence on imports rendered it exceptionally vulnerable, then envisaged fighting a limited war in the East, while sending large land and air forces to Europe.
The U.S. chiefs of staff recognised that Germany represented by far the more dangerous menace. The Japanese, for all their impressive frontline military and naval capability, could not threaten the American or British homelands. Of the white Anglo-Saxon nations, only Australia lay within plausible reach of Tokyo’s forces, which prompted intense bitterness among Australian politicians about Britain’s unwillingness to dispatch substantial forces to its defence. In the event, while the broad principles established by Stark were sustained, the dominance of Russia in defeating the Wehrmacht—wholly unanticipated in December 1941—somewhat altered the balance of America’s wartime commitments. While the army the United States eventually dispatched to Europe was large, it was nothing like as powerful as would have been necessary had the Western Allies been obliged to fulfil the principal role in defeating Germany. As a corollary of this, once Russia’s survival and fighting power became plain in 1943, the American chiefs of staff felt able to divert significant strength to the Pacific sooner than expected; popular sentiment, so much more hostile