Inferno - Max Hastings [143]
Wavell was haunted by memories of the allegations of pessimism and defeatism thrown at him by Churchill before his 1941 sacking as Middle East C-in-C. In Southeast Asia, he strove to show himself a man of steel, to put spine into his subordinates. “Our troops in Burma are not fighting with proper spirit,” he signalled London. “I have not the least doubt that this is in great part due to lack of drive and inspiration from the top.” In truth, so much was wrong with Britain’s Far East forces that the rot was unstoppable in the midst of a Japanese offensive. Wavell seemed to acknowledge this in another signal to London: “I am very disturbed at lack of real fighting spirit in our troops shown in Malaya and so far in Burma. Neither British, Australians or Indians have shown real toughness of mind or body … Causes go deep, softness of last twenty years, lack of vigour in peace training, effects of climate and atmosphere of East.” Wavell became a regular visitor to Rangoon, likened by one historian to “a Harley Street specialist, complete with a black bag, coming to see a very sick patient.”
On 5 March Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Alexander arrived to take command. The impeccable “Alex,” Churchill’s favourite general, could only contribute his unfailing personal grace and serenity to what now became a rout. Initially he ordered a halt to the British retreat, then within twenty-four hours accepted that Rangoon could not be held and endorsed its evacuation. The invaders missed a priceless opportunity to trap the entire British army in Burma when a local Japanese commander withdrew a strong roadblock closing the road north. Misinterpreting his orders, he supposed that all the attacking forces were intended to close on Rangoon for a big battle. This fumbled pass allowed Alexander’s force to retreat northwards—and the general himself to escape captivity.
In desperation, Wavell accepted Chiang Kai-shek’s offer of two Chinese Nationalist divisions. Chinese willingness to join the campaign was not altruistic. The Japanese advance in the north had closed the Burma Road, by which American supplies reached China. Reopening it was a vital Chinese interest. Wavell’s caution about acceptance of assistance from Chiang’s troops was prompted by knowledge that they lacked their own supply system and aspired to live off the land. There were also doubts about who gave their orders: U.S. general Joseph Stilwell claimed that he did, only to be contradicted by Chinese general Tu Lu Ming, who told Burma’s governor, Dorman-Smith: “The American General only thinks he is commanding. In fact he is doing no such thing. You see, we Chinese think that the only way to keep the Americans in the war is to give them a few commands on paper. They will not do much harm as long as we do the work!”
Stilwell, an inveterate anglophobe, was underwhelmed by his first meeting with Alexander on 13 March. He wrote in his diary with accustomed sourness: “Astonished to find me—mere me, a goddam American—in command of Chinese troops. ‘Extrawdinery!’ Looked me over as if I had just crawled out from under a rock!” Stilwell was given