Inferno - Max Hastings [259]
The Vietminh—by that time numbering about 5,000 active supporters—were happy to fight the French, but showed no interest in engaging the Japanese. They either stored their weapons in readiness for the postwar independence struggle or brandished them to impose their will on the rural population. Under pressure from Washington, the OSS persuaded the guerrillas to make some show of engaging the occupiers; one group staged a noisy demonstration against a small Japanese supply column, which turned and fled without suffering much harm. On another occasion, on 17 July 1945, a Vietminh battalion led by Vo Nguyen Giap attacked a Japanese outpost at Tâm Doa, killing eight of its forty defenders and capturing the remainder. But this appears to have been the sum of the Vietminh contribution to the Allied cause, in return for U.S. deliveries of several tons of weapons and equipment, which were later used against the returning French colonialists.
BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT overseas element in the Allied war effort was, of course, the British Empire. London’s relations with the white self-governing dominions were conducted with considerable clumsiness and indeed ruthlessness under the exigencies of global conflict, and policy towards the black and brown nations of the empire was uncompromising. The prime minister asserted his determination to sustain hegemony over India, and outraged American opinion by declaring in November 1942 that he had not become the king’s first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. Most of his people were warmly sentimental about the contribution of Indian and colonial troops to the war effort, heedless of the fact that their services were purchased for cash and only rarely inspired by loyalty to, or even understanding of, the Allied cause. James Mpagi from Kampala, Uganda, said: “We thought perhaps war was something very simple … perhaps the same thing as if people were quarrelling for a cow or [between] neighbouring villages.”
Britain took for granted the loyalty of its black and brown peoples, and in 1939 this was promptly expressed in the form of messages of support from colonial governors and prominent citizens. There was no significant dissent: black Africa and the Caribbean eventually contributed some 500,000 recruits to the war effort; three African divisions carried arms in Burma, while most other black soldiers performed labour service. Britain never introduced military conscription in its African possessions, but strong local pressure and sometimes compulsion were exercised to mobilise tribesmen who served in British uniform under the command of white officers. Batison Geresomo of Nyasaland recalled later: “When we heard about the conflict, we were not sure … whether they will be taking everybody by force … the white man came in all the districts to recruit soldiers. Some were taken by the chiefs’ force and some went on their own wish.” In addition, conscription for agricultural labour service was widely introduced in East Africa, much to the profit of white settler farmers. Local chiefs in the Gold Coast colony bowed to the wishes of the authorities by urging their young men to enlist. Recruiting bands sang songs to attract men, one punning the Akan word barima—“brave man”—with Burma.
Barima ehh yen ko ooh!
Barima yen ko ooh!
Yen ko East Africa, Barima
Besin, na yen ko!
Brave men and warriors let us go [enlist]
Brave men and warriors let us go [enlist]
Let us go to East Africa and Burma
Come let us go [enlist]
Kofi Genfi described the recruiting