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By Root 1403 0

U.S. Navy gained overwhelming dominance of the Pacific. Blockade rendered inevitable the collapse of an enemy wholly dependent on imported fuel and raw materials; American submarines achieved the strangulation of Japanese commerce which Germany’s U-boats had failed to impose on Britain. Seldom in history has such a small force—16,000 men, 1.6 percent of the sea service’s strength, with never more than 50 boats deployed—gained such decisive results. American submarines were responsible for 55 percent of all Japan’s wartime shipping losses, 1,300 vessels totalling over 6 million tons; their destructive achievement climaxed in October 1944, when they sank 322,265 tons of shipping. Thereafter, Japanese losses diminished only because they had little cargo tonnage left to sink; Japan’s bulk imports fell by 40 percent.

It is extraordinary that Hirohito’s nation went to war knowing the importance and vulnerability of its merchant shipping, yet without seriously addressing convoy protection; the Tokyo regime built huge warships for the Combined Fleet, but grossly inadequate numbers of escorts. Japanese antisubmarine techniques lagged far behind those of other belligerents. Their radar and airborne antisubmarine capabilities were so feeble that American boats could often operate on the surface in daylight. While the Germans lost 781 U-boats and Japan 128, the Imperial Japanese Navy sank only 41 U.S. submarines; 6 more foundered in accidents. American submariners suffered a loss rate comparable with airmen—almost one man in four—but the results they achieved were so important that this sacrifice was cheap at the price. The U.S. investment of industrial resources in submarines was a fraction of that lavished on the B-29 Superfortress bombers which belatedly joined the assault, and the undersea arm contributed far more to victory.

Japanese island garrisons found themselves isolated, immobilised and starving. A soldier on Bougainville wrote on 14 September 1944: “Old friendships dissolve when men are starving. Each man is always trying to satisfy his own hunger. It’s much more frightening than meeting the enemy’s assaults. There is a vicious war going on within our ranks. Can spiritual power degenerate to this?” American air and naval dominance denied Japan any chance of launching an effective strategic counterstroke. Its soldiers, sailors and airmen still enjoyed many opportunities to die bravely, to inflict suffering and death on their foes and the oppressed subjects of their empire. But the nation’s fate was sealed.

It was rationally unnecessary for the Allies to launch major ground operations in Southeast Asia—or, for that matter, the Philippines. If they merely maintained naval blockade and air bombardment, the Japanese people must eventually starve, their oil-deprived war machine would be reduced to impotence. Given the nature of war, democracies and global geopolitics, however, “eventually” was not soon enough. In the spring of 1944, it was taken for granted that Allied forces must attack the Japanese wherever possible. The British had confronted them for two years on the northeast frontier of India without making significant advances, but now at last resources, including large numbers of U.S. transport aircraft, became available to mount an offensive with overwhelming superiority.

Churchill opposed an overland operation to reconquer Burma; Gen. “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell complained bitterly to Marshall in July 1944 that “[The British] simply do not want to fight in Burma or reopen communications with China.” This was true. “India is not at present a suitable base from which to launch large-scale operations,” asserted a joint Anglo-American report in the spring of 1944. “Her transport system is already overtaxed, her political situation unsatisfactory, and her economic position precarious.” Australia, said this document, offered far more convenient basing facilities. The British Empire’s soldiers had been repeatedly worsted in jungle warfare; Churchill preferred an amphibious landing in southern Burma, below Rangoon, or better