Inside Cyber Warfare - Jeffrey Carr [131]
Figure 15-1. Russian cyber security structure
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[76] The unclassified Russian Military Doctrine is accompanied by classified annexes with implementation instructions. Russian government and Russian military personnel comment on the unclassified documents; however, references to the classified annexes are infrequent. Nevertheless, they led to changes in force structure and training that can be tracked.
[77] The Russian Federation Security Council operates as an operational staff both coordinating and implementing policy through a system of Interdepartmental Commissions. It exercises more authority than the US National Security Council (NSC), which is a policy coordination body.
[78] Career intelligence officer Colonel-General (Ret.) Vladislav Petrovich Sherstyuk has headed the Information Security Department since 1999. Sherstyuk started in the signals intelligence components of the Committee on State Security (KGB). He is a cryptologist by training.
[79] The doctrine’s threat definitions, especially technical threats, are similar to those found in US documents. However, there are differences. For example, the doctrine repeatedly defines threats posed by “disinformation” and “propaganda” that threaten citizens’ “spiritual life” and the Russian government’s ability to communicate with domestic and foreign audiences. Foreign ownership of networks and media is defined as a threat. Monopolies—whether foreign or domestic—controlling dissemination of information are defined as threats. The “unlawful use of special techniques influencing the individual, group, and social consciousness” is also perceived as a threat.
[80] For example, the operator could release the data to “protect the life, health and other vital interests of the personal data subject or others if you cannot obtain the written consent of the subject of personal data.”
[81] Frequently translated as FSTEK. However, they are the same organization.
[82] Under Russian law, even the Ministry of Defense uses cryptography that the FSB can monitor. The Federal Security Organization (FSO) provides presidential communications using FSB-approved cryptographic technology—however, the FSO maintains the keys.
[83] Depending on the translation source, this can also appear as the Federal Protection Service. They are the same organization.
Russian Ministry of Defense
We now turn to changes in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) driven by the Information Security Doctrine. These changes enhance the MOD’s ability to develop IO- relevant technology and rationalize IO force structures.
Administrative Changes
President Putin’s Edict No. 1477 in November 2007 mandated changes in the Russian Ministry of Defense. The edict created two new deputy defense ministers. The Deputy for Information and Telecommunications Technologies now handles automated control systems, telecommunications, and information technology. Russian press commentary stated that this transferred responsibilities from the Directorate of Communication Troops and the General Staff’s 8th Directorate (Information Security) to a civilian. Press commentary also stated that the General Staff was not pleased. Chief of General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky, his First Deputy, the chief of the Main Operations Directorate, the chairman of the General Staff Military Scientific Committee, and the chief of Armed Forces Communications all left their offices in protest over the diminution of their authority.[84] The first deputy minister was Major General (Reserves) Oleg Eskin, a former FSB officer.
While not stated specifically, the new deputy defense minister’s portfolio almost certainly includes IO.
Electronic Warfare Troops
The decade after the 2000 Information Security Doctrine saw an explosion of IO writing by Russian military officers and defense oriented academics (see the sidebar, Russian Information Technology (IT) Security Training). Some, such as Noncontact Wars by Major General (Ret.) Vladimir