Inside Cyber Warfare - Jeffrey Carr [168]
A credible active defense strategy that incorporated counter proxy measures would likely need to have an overt as well as a covert component. The overt component would relate to extending political, moral, and diplomatic support to the elements of those states that struggle against the regimes. The covert component, likely never to be discussed publicly, would be integral to the success of preventing and deterring states from using cyber attacks to harm US national security. Legally justified as self-defense under the UN Charter and customary international law, the covert component would also need to be executed in a proportionate manner to the threat.
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[246] Charles Clover, “Kremlin-Backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz,” Financial Times, March 11, 2009, p. 8.
[247] Tania Branigan and Kevin Anderson, “Google Attacks Traced Back to China, Says US Internet Security Firm,” The Guardian, January 14, 2010.
[248] United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), International Court of Justice 3 (May 24, 1980), 29. The issue of state responsibility for nonstate actors was also an issue in the ICJ Nicaragua litigation where the court concluded that in order for the actions of the nonstate actors to be attributable to the state, the state had to have “effective control” over the nonstate actors. More recently in the Prosecutor v. Tadic case, the international tribunal held that a foreign state’s overall control, rather than effective control, of a nonstate military organization may render that state responsible for acts of the organization. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment on Appeal, pp. 115–162 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 15, 1999).
Index
A NOTE ON THE DIGITAL INDEX
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Symbols
0-day exploits, Cyber: The Chaotic Domain (see zero-day exploits)
1st Information Operations Command (United States), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
24h Air Force (United States), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
36 stratagems, The 36 Stratagems
67th Network Warfare Wing (United States), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
688th Combat Communications Wing (United States), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
688th Information Operations Wing (United States), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
A
Aarelaid, Hillar, ESTDomains
Abrakhimov, Maksim, Nashi
acausal connecting principle, Conducting Operations in the Cyber-Space-Time Continuum
active defenses, Responding to International Cyber Attacks as Acts of War, The Road Ahead: A Proposal to Use Active Defenses, The Choice to Use Active Defenses, Technological limitations and jus in bello analysis, Technological Limitations and Jus ad Bellum Analysis, Technological Limitations and Jus ad Bellum Analysis, Limitations on attack traces, Limitations on attack detection, Limitations on attack classification, Limitations on attack traces, Jus in Bello Issues Related to the Use of Active Defenses, Active defenses: The most appropriate forceful response, Technological limitations and jus in bello analysis, The United States Should Use Active Defenses to Defend Its Critical Information Systems, Active Defense for Cyber: A Legal Framework for Covert Countermeasures, Cyber Active Defense Under International