Inside Cyber Warfare - Jeffrey Carr [185]
Jurm Team
C-H Team (aka H-C Team)
Hackers Pal
Gaza Hacker Team
DNS Team
!TeAm RaBaT-SaLe! (aka Team Rabat-Sale or Team Rabat-Sala)
DZ Team
Ashianeh Security Group
Nimr al-Iraq (“The Tiger of Iraq”) and XX_Hacker_XX
Methods of Attack
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) capability
Website defacements
Viruses and Trojans
Israeli Retaliation
Control the Voice of the Opposition by Controlling the Content in Cyberspace: Nigeria
Are Nonstate Hackers a Protected Asset?
3. The Legal Status of Cyber Warfare
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaties
The Antarctic Treaty System and Space Law
UNCLOS
MLAT
United States Versus Russian Federation: Two Different Approaches
The Law of Armed Conflict
Is This an Act of Cyber Warfare?
South Korea
Iran
Tatarstan
United States
Kyrgyzstan
Israel and the Palestinian National Authority
Zimbabwe
Myanmar
Cyber: The Chaotic Domain
4. Responding to International Cyber Attacks as Acts of War
The Legal Dilemma
The Road Ahead: A Proposal to Use Active Defenses
The Law of War
General Prohibition on the Use of Force
The First Exception: UN Security Council Actions
The Second Exception: Self-Defense
A Subset of Self-Defense: Anticipatory Self-Defense
An Alternate Basis for Using Active Defenses: Reprisals
Nonstate Actors and the Law of War
Armed Attacks by Nonstate Actors
Duties between States
Imputing State Responsibility for Acts by Nonstate Actors
Cross-Border Operations
Analyzing Cyber Attacks under Jus ad Bellum
Cyber Attacks as Armed Attacks
Establishing State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks
The Duty to Prevent Cyber Attacks
Support from International Conventions
Support from State Practice
Support from the General Principles of Law
Support from Judicial Opinions
Fully Defining a State’s Duty to Prevent Cyber Attacks
Sanctuary States and the Practices That Lead to State Responsibility
The Choice to Use Active Defenses
Technological Limitations and Jus ad Bellum Analysis
Limitations on attack detection
Limitations on attack classification
Limitations on attack traces
Jus in Bello Issues Related to the Use of Active Defenses
Active defenses: The most appropriate forceful response
Technological limitations and jus in bello analysis
Conclusion
5. The Intelligence Component to Cyber Warfare
The Korean DDoS Attacks (July 2009)
The Botnet Versus the Malware
The DPRK’s Capabilities in Cyberspace
One Year After the RU-GE War, Social Networking Sites Fall to DDoS Attack
Ingushetia Conflict, August 2009
The Predictive Role of Intelligence
6. Nonstate Hackers and the Social Web
Russia
China
The Middle East
Pakistani Hackers and Facebook
The Dark Side of Social Networks
The Cognitive Shield
Examples of OPSEC violations
Adversary scenarios
Study findings
TwitterGate: A Real-World Example of a Social Engineering Attack with Dire Consequences
Automating the Process
Catching More Spies with Robots
The automation and virtualization of social network entities
Owning social network users for a small budget of $300–$1,300
Bringing down a social network from the inside
7. Follow the Money
False Identities
Components of a Bulletproof Network
ICANN
The Accredited Registrar
The Hosting Company
The Bulletproof Network of StopGeorgia.ru
StopGeorgia.ru
NAUNET.RU
SteadyHost.ru
Innovation IT Solutions Corp
Mirhosting.com
SoftLayer Technologies
SORM-2
The Kremlin and the Russian Internet
Nashi
The Kremlin Spy for Hire Program
Sergei Markov, Estonia, and Nashi
A Three-Tier Model of Command and Control
8. Organized Crime in Cyberspace
A Subtle Threat
Atrivo/Intercage
ESTDomains
McColo: Bulletproof