Inside Cyber Warfare - Jeffrey Carr [29]
(2) MCNOSC: INVESTIGATE THE TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS AND FORWARD TO MCEN DAA.
(3) MCEN DAA: FINAL APPROVAL AUTHORITY. MCEN DAA WILL STIPULATE HOW ACCESS TO INTERNET SNS IS OBTAINED BASED ON MISSION NEED (I.E., THROUGH NIPRNET OR GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED COMMERCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE).
IT PROCUREMENT. IT PROCUREMENTS MADE TO FACILITATE INTERNET SNS USE MUST CONTAIN AN APPROVED WAIVER REQUEST.
CANCELLATION. THIS MARADMIN WILL BE CANCELLED ONE YEAR FROM DATE OF PUBLICATION.
RELEASE AUTHORIZED BY BGEN G. J. ALLEN, DIRECTOR, COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS/CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE MARINE CORPS.//
DMC-PR-05-07-02 dated 5 August 2009
Version 1.0
ONLINE ENGAGEMENT GUIDELINES
SUMMARY
Not everyone agrees with the USMC’s new policy, including the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who said in an interview with Next.gov:
“Obviously we need to find right balance between security and transparency,” Adm. Mike Mullen Tweeted (http://twitter.com/TheJointStaff) after the Marine Corps said (http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20090804_3800.php?oref=topnews) it would ban social networking sites. “We are working on that. But am I still going to tweet? You bet.”
While the US Department of Defense continues to study the issues surrounding the use of social media, the UK Ministry of Defense released its social software guidelines for service members on August 5, 2009.
Service and MOD civilian personnel are encouraged to talk about what they do, but within certain limits to protect security, reputation and privacy. An increasingly important channel for this engagement, and to keep in touch with family and friends is social media (such as social networking sites, blogs and other internet self-publishing). Personnel may make full use of these but must:
Follow the same high standards of conduct and behaviour online as would be expected elsewhere;
Always maintain personal, information and operational security and be careful about the information they share online;
Get authorisation from their chain of command when appropriate (see para 2 below);
Service and MOD civilian personnel do not need to seek clearance when talking online about factual, unclassified, uncontroversial nonoperational matters, but should seek authorisation from their chain of command before publishing any wider information relating to their work which:
Relates to operations or deployments;
Offers opinions on wider Defence and Armed Forces activity, or on third parties without their permission; or
Attempts to speak, or could be interpreted as speaking, on behalf of your Service or the MOD; or,
Relates to controversial, sensitive or political matters.
If in doubt personnel should always seek advice from their chain of command / line management.
The UK approach to managing its Defense Ministry personnel’s online activities is much saner and safer than an outright ban. The solution lies in discussion and training. A ban would simply drive the unwanted behavior underground, where it would morph into something potentially even more dangerous and unmanageable.
Chapter 4. Responding to International Cyber Attacks as Acts of War
Whereas the previous chapter discussed some of the legal questions and strategies being debated among the international community of legal scholars, this chapter focuses on one strategy in particular that addresses the fuzzy role of nonstate actors in cyber conflicts between nation-states, that is, assigning states responsibility for their nonaction and enacting consequences because of it.
I want to thank Lt. Cdr. Matt Sklerov for laboriously rewriting his 111-page thesis so that I could include it in this book.[3] In my opinion, Matt is one of the rising stars of the Department of Defense, and I feel privileged that he has consented to have his work republished here. Although there