Inside Cyber Warfare - Jeffrey Carr [72]
Nosik also pointed out that the Kremlin either owns the pipes (Rostelekom, Transtelekom, and Elektrotelekom) or controls the licenses of every communications channel in Russia. This degree of control may work against the Russian Federation if an international body determines that it could have acted to stop cyber attacks originating from within its borders but didn’t.
The Kremlin and the Russian Internet
One of the most difficult questions that the Project Grey Goose team faced in investigating the cyber war between Russian and Georgia was whether there was evidence of Russian government involvement. Our key finding in October 2008 was:
We assess with high confidence that the Russian government will likely continue its practice of distancing itself from the Russian nationalistic hacker community thus gaining deniability while passively supporting and enjoying the strategic benefits of their actions.
While forum members are quite open about their targets and methods, we were unable in this round of collection/analysis to find any references to state organizations guiding or directing attacks. There are several possible explanations as to why this is the case.
There was no external involvement or direction from State organizations.
Our collection efforts were not far-reaching or deep enough to identify these connections.
Involvement by State organizations was done in an entirely non-attributable way.
The situation has since changed. In February 2009, the Russian media reported a story that has provided new evidence pointing to how the Russian government sponsors and pays leaders of Russian youth organizations to engage in information operations, up to and including hacking, to silence or suppress opposition groups.
Nashi
Nashi (http://nashi.su) is short for Molodezhnoye demokraticheskoye antifashistskoye dvizhenye “Nashi” (translation, “Youth Democratic Anti-Fascist Movement ‘Ours!’”). Its logo is shown in Figure 7-9. It was formed in 2005 to either counter the possibility of another youth revolt like the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine or counter a growing interest in Nazism in Russia. Funding for the group purportedly comes from Russian business owners; however, there has been widespread speculation that it receives government funding as well, which has been strengthened in recent days by the Anna Bukovskaya story (related later in this section).
Figure 7-9. The Nashi logo
One of the most important supporters of Nashi is Vladislav Surkov, the first deputy chief of the presidential staff and, more importantly, a man who has the ear of Russian Prime Minister Vladmir Putin.
Surkov intends to use Nashi to enforce the Kremlin’s will regarding RUNET communications, i.e., “Ensure the domination of pro-Kremlin views on the Internet” (published by The New Times Online in Russian, February 16, 2009). That’s easier said then done, particularly since that effort was tried and abandoned about 10 years ago by RUNET co-founder Anton Nosek.
Surkov has a new plan that involves the enlistment of Russian youth organizations, including Nashi and United Russia. He has organized a March 2009 conference with about 20 key people in the Russian blogging community, as well as leaders of the aforementioned youth organizations, some of whom include:
Maksim Abrakhimov, the Voronezh commissar of the Nashi movement and blogger
Mariya Drokova, Nashi commissar and recipient of the Order for Services to the Fatherland Second Class medal for her “energetic” work in the area of youth policy
Mariya Sergeyeva, leader of the United Russia youth wing Young Guard
Samson Sholademi, popular Russian blogger
Darya Mitina, former state duma deputy and Russian Communist Youth Union leader
Other attendees included Russian spin doctors who specialize in controlling the messages communicated via the blogosphere. The objective was a straightforward Information