Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [106]
Politicization by intelligence officers may also be a question of perception. A consensus could probably be reached on what politicized intelligence looked like, but much less agreement would emerge on whether a specific analysis fit the definition.
Thus, politicized intelligence remains a concern, albeit a somewhat vague one, which may make it more difficult and important. Many issues surrounding politicized intelligence came up in the hearings on Robert Gates’s second nomination as DCI, such as when several analysts charged that Gates had altered analyses on the Soviet Union to meet policy makers’ preferences. (Gates asked President Reagan to withdraw his first nomination during the Iran-contra affair. He was subsequently renominated by President George Bush and confirmed in 1991.)
Politicization was also a concern in the Iraq WMD issue. In 2003 the press reported that Vice President Dick Cheney had been out to the CIA several times to receive briefings on Iraq. Critics saw the visits as an attempt to influence the analysts, even though intelligence officials and analysts maintained that they were not swayed. Is there a proper number of times a senior official should be briefed on a highly sensitive topic, after which it appears to be politicization? The answer likely is no. What matters is the substance of the exchange. Also, such exchanges are a primary reason for intelligence agencies—to help officials make decisions. In Britain, charges of politicization on Iraq centered on accusations that Prime Minister Tony Blair or his office asked Defence Ministry officials to “sex up” their intelligence on Iraq WMD, which the government denied. Three external reviews of intelligence on Iraq, by the Senate Intelligence Committee and the WMD Commission in the United States and by Lord Butler in Britain, all concluded that the intelligence had not been politicized. A fourth report, done for the Australian government, came to the same conclusion.
A second type of politicized intelligence is caused by policy makers who may react strongly to intelligence, depending on whether it confirms or refutes their preferences for policy outcomes. For example, according to press accounts in November 1998, Vice President Al Gore’s staff rejected CIA reports about the personal corruption of Russian premier Viktor Chernomyrdin. Staff members argued that the administration had to deal with Chernomyrdin, corrupt or not, and that the intelligence was inconclusive. Analysts countered that the administration set the standard for proof so high that it was unlikely to be met by intelligence. The analysts found that they were censoring their reports to avoid further disputes with the White House. Both policy and intelligence officers denied the allegations.
Policy makers may also use intelligence issues for partisan purposes. Two examples in the United States were the missile gap (1959-1961) and the window of vulnerability (1979-1981). In both cases, the party that was out of power (the Democrats in the first case, the Republicans in the second) argued that the Soviet Union had gained a strategic nuclear advantage over the United States, which was being ignored or not reported. In both cases, the accusing party won the election (not because of its charges) and subsequently learned that the intelligence did not support the accusations—which it then simply claimed had been resolved.
Finally, as noted above, the increased use of unclassified NIEs or their KJs also poses a threat of increased politicization of intelligence.
ANALYTICAL STANDARDS. As this chapter has argued, there is a set of standards in intelligence analysis. Most of them are fairly well-known and accepted, although, until recently, little effort was made to codify them. This changed in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks and the Iraq WMD issue. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA, 2004) includes a number of standards for intelligence analysis. The DNI’s office