Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [127]
However, should committee members or the staffers raise serious questions, a prudent covert action briefing team reports that fact to the executive branch. This should be enough to cause the operation to be reviewed. The executive branch may still decide to go ahead, or it may make changes in the operation to respond to congressional concerns. According to press accounts, the George W. Bush administration considered a covert action to support certain parties and candidates in the Iraqi election in 2005 but rescinded the action because of congressional opposition.
The covert action policy system, for all of its rules, remains fragile because of its inherent secrecy. The Iran-contra scandal underscored some of its weaknesses. A majority in Congress, opposed to support for the contras in Nicaragua, cut off funding. President Ronald Reagan, in his usual broad manner, urged his National Security Council (NSC) staff to help the contras “keep body and soul together.” NSC staffer Lt. Col. Oliver L. North did this by soliciting donations from private individuals and foreign governments, alleging that DCI William J. Casey, who died just as the scandal broke, had approved his actions. North also argued that Congress’s restrictions applied to the Department of Defense (DOD) and intelligence agencies, not to the NSC staff. In a parallel activity, the NSC staff pursued clandestine efforts to improve ties to Iran and free hostages in the Middle East, despite earlier objections to this policy by the secretaries of state (George P. Shultz) and defense (Caspar W. Weinberger). Israel shipped antitank missiles to Iran at the behest of the NSC staff, with the United States replacing them in Israel’s inventory. North also became involved in the Iranian initiative and suggested diverting to the contras the money that Iran had paid for the missiles.
Iran-contra pointed up several problems in the covert action process.
• Questionable delegations of authority ordered and managed covert actions (the actions of North on the NSC staff).
• Presidential findings were postdated and signed ex post facto (the finding authorizing the sale of missiles to Iran).
• Disparate operations were merged (using the Iranian money to fund the contras).
• The executive branch failed to keep Congress properly informed (disregarding the laws restricting aid to the contras and not briefing on the finding to sell missiles to Iran).
Debates on the worthiness of the respective policies involved in Iran-contra notwithstanding. NSC staff and other executive branch officials violated a host of accepted norms and rules in managing the operations.
The creation of the post of director of national intelligence (DNI) in 2004 raises new questions for the supervision of covert action. The DNI is now the president’s senior intelligence adviser, which would presumably include covert action, one of the most important types of intelligence activities. Operational responsibility for conducting covert action remains within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The law states that the new director of the CIA (DCIA) reports to the DNI, but it does not specify how extensive this reporting requirement is. The law is clear that the DNI does not have operational control over the CIA. Thus, the DNI will have to create mechanisms that will allow for insight into covert action capabilities and the status of ongoing operations. One can easily foresee situations in which the DNI and the DCIA will be at odds over covert action.
THE RANGE OF COVERT ACTIONS
Covert actions encompass many types of activities.
Propaganda is the old political technique of disseminating information that has been created with a specific political outcome in mind. Propaganda can be used to support individuals or groups friendly to one’s own side or to undermine one’s opponents. It can also