Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [13]
By the late 1950s to early 1960s the proximate school became the preferred model for U.S. intelligence. But the debate was significant in that it underscored the early and persistent fears about intelligence becoming politicized.
In the late 1990s there were two subtle shifts in the policy-intelligence relationship. The first was a greatly increased emphasis on support to military operations, which some believed gave too much priority to this sector—at a time when threats to national security had seemingly decreased—at the expense of other intelligence consumers. The second was the feeling among some analysts that they were being torn between operational customers and analytical customers.
The apotheosis of the proximate relationship may have come under President George W. Bush (2001- ) who, upon taking office, requested that he receive an intelligence briefing six days a week. DCIs George Tenet and Porter J. Goss (2004-2005) attended these daily briefings, which was unprecedented for a DCI. This greatly increased degree of proximity led some observers to question its possible effects on the DCI’s ability to remain objective about the intelligence being offered. This practice continued under Directors of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte (2005-2007) and Mike McConnell (2007- ).
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANALYSIS AND COLLECTION AND COVERT ACTION. Parallel to the debate about producer-consumer relations, factions have waged a similar debate about the proper relationship between intelligence analysis, on the one hand, and intelligence collection and covert action, on the other.
The issue has centered largely on the structure of the CIA, which includes both analytical and operational components: the Directorate of Intelligence and what had been the Directorate of Operations (DO), which is now called the National Clandestine Service (NCS). The NCS is responsible for both espionage and covert action. Again, distance and proximate schools of thought took form. The distance school argued that analysis and the two operational functions are largely distinct and that housing them together could be risky for the security of human sources and methods and for analysis. Adherents raised concerns about the ability of the DI to provide objective analysis when the DO/NCS is concurrently running a major covert action. Will covert operators exert pressure, either overt or subliminal, to have analysis support the covert action? As an example of such a conflict of interest, such stresses existed between some analytical components of the intelligence community and supporters of the counterrevolutionaries (contras) who were fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in the 1980s. Some analysts questioned whether the contras would ever be victorious, which was seen as unsupportive by some advocates of the contras’ cause.
The proximate school argued that separating the two functions deprives both analysis and operations of the benefits of a close relationship. Analysts gain a better appreciation of operational goals and realities, which can be factored into their work, as well as a better sense of the value of sources developed in espionage. Operators gain a better appreciation of the analyses they receive, which can be factored into their own planning.
Although critics of the current structure have repeatedly suggested separating analytical and operational components, the proximate school has prevailed. In the mid-1990s the DI and DO entered a partnership that resulted in bringing together their front offices and various regional offices. This did not entirely improve their working relationship. One of the by-products of the 2002 Iraq WMD estimate was an effort to give analysts greater insight into DO sources. This was largely a reaction to the agent named CURVE BALL, a human source under German control whose reporting on Iraqi biological weapons proved to be fabricated, unbeknownst to some analysts, who unwittingly continued to use this reporting as part of their supporting intelligence