Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [133]
One concern raised by the conduct of covert actions is their possible effect on intelligence analysis, which is carried out, in part, by the same agency conducting the operation. If the CIA is conducting an operation—particularly a paramilitary operation—is it reasonable to expect analysts of the CIA to produce objective reports on the situation and the progress of the paramilitary operation? Or will there be a certain impetus, perhaps unstated, to be supportive of the operation? DCI Allen Dulles kept the Directorate of Intelligence—the CIA’s analytical arm—ignorant of operations in Indonesia (1957-1958) and at the Bay of Pigs (1961) so as not to contaminate it with knowledge of these operations.
In seventeenth- and (to a lesser extent) eighteenth-century Europe, statesmen occasionally used assassination as a foreign policy tool. Heads of state, who were royalty at this time, were exempt from this officially sanctioned act, but their ministers and generals were not. Soviet intelligence occasionally undertook “wet affairs,” as it referred to assassinations. Israeli intelligence has allegedly killed individuals outside of Israel. More recently, a former KGB officer, Alexander Litvinenko, was assassinated in London via radioactive polonium. The British government suspects Russian involvement in the 2006 assassination. The Church Committee (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), chaired by Frank Church. I)-Idaho, was formed in 1975 to investigate allegations that the CIA had exceeded its charter. The panel found in 1976 that the United States was involved in several assassination plots in the 1960s and 1970s—the most famous being that against Fidel Castro—although none succeeded. (See box, “Assassination: The Hitler Argument. ”)
Since 1976 the United States has formally banned the use of assassination, either directly by the United States or through a third party. The ban has been written into three successive executive orders, the most recent signed by President Reagan in 1981, which remains in effect.
Still, the policy remains controversial. Although support for the ban was fairly widespread when instituted by President Gerald R. Ford (1974-1977), debate over the policy has been growing. Opponents continue to hold that it is morally wrong for a state to target specific individuals. But proponents have argued that assassination might be the best option in some instances and might be morally acceptable, depending on the nature of the target. Drawing up such guidelines still appears to be so difficult as to preclude a return to the previous policy. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, debate over the assassination ban was renewed. (See box, “The Assassination Ban: A Modern Interpretation. ”) The issue had changed somewhat, however, in that the United States now considered itself to be at war with terrorists, which altered the nature of the target and the legitimacy of using violent force. (See chap. 13 for a more detailed discussion of the ethical and moral issues raised by assassination.)
ASSASSINATION: THE HITLER ARGUMENT
Adolf Hitler is often cited as a good argument in favor of assassination as an occasional but highly exceptional policy option But when would a policy maker have made the decision to have him killed? Hitler assumed power legally in 1933. Throughout the 1930s he was not the only dictator in Europe who repressed civil liberties or arrested and killed large numbers of his own population. Josef Stalin probably killed more Soviet citizens during collectivization and the great purges than the Nazis