Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [135]
Chomeau. John B. “Covert Action’s Proper Role in U.S. Policy.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2 (fall 1988): 407-413.
Daugherty, William J. “Approval and Review of Covert Action Programs since Reagan.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17 (spring 2004): 62-80.
Gilligan, Tom. 10.000 Days with the Agency. Boston: Intelligence Books Division, 2003.
Godson, Roy S. Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s. 1996.
Johnson, Loch K. “Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America’s Secret Foreign Policy.” International Studies Quarterly 33 (March 1989): 81-109.
Knott, Stephen F. Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Prados, John. Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War II. New York: William Morrow, 1986.
Reisman, W. Michael, and James E. Baker. Regulating Covert Action: Practices. Contexts, and Policies of Covert Coercion Abroad in International and American Law. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
Rositzke, Harry. The CIA’s Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action. New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1977.
Shulsky, Abram N., and Gary J. Schmitt. Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence. 2d rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993.
Stiefler, Todd. “CIA’s Leadership and Major Covert Operations: Rogue Elephants or Risk-Averse Bureaucrats?” Intelligenre and National Security 19 (winter 2004): 632-654.
Treverton, Gregory F. Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World. New York: Basic Books. 1987.
CHAPTER 9
THE ROLE OF THE POLICY MAKER
MOST AUTHORS and experts in the area of intelligence do not consider the policy maker to be part of the intelligence process. In their opinion, once the intelligence has been given to the policy client, the intelligence process is complete. The view in this book is that policy makers play such a central role at all stages of the process that it would be a mistake to omit them. Policy makers do more than receive intelligence; they shape it. Without a constant reference to policy, intelligence is rendered meaningless. Moreover, policy makers can play a determining role at every phase of the intelligence process.
THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS
Although much of this book is intended to be a generic discussion of intelligence, the main reference point is the U.S. government. Therefore, a brief discussion of how national security policy is formed in the United States is appropriate.
STRUCTURE AND INTERESTS. The five main loci of the U.S. national security policy process are1. The president, as an individual;
2. The departments, particularly the State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD), which has two major components: the civilian (the Office of the Secretary of Defense) and the military (the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS, and the Joint Staff), and on certain issues, other departments may also be involved [including Justice, Commerce. Treasury, Agriculture, and, after the September 2001 attacks, the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS)];
3. The National Security Council (NSC) staff, which is the hub of the system; there is also a Homeland Security Council, but it operates at a somewhat lower level;
4. The intelligence community; and
5. Congress, which controls all expenditures, makes policy in its own right, and performs oversight.
The main national security structure was remarkably stable from its inception in the National Security Act of 1947 until the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which radically changed the top management structure of the intelligence community.
The five groups that carry out the intelligence process have varying interests. Presidents are transient, mainly concerned about broad policy initiatives and, eventually,