Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [142]
Again, regarding Cuba, President Jimmy Carter unilaterally suspended U-2 flights as a gesture to improve bilateral relations. Carter came to regret his decision in 1980, when he faced the possibility that a Soviet combat brigade was in Cuba and he required better intelligence on the issue.
Finally, the intelligence community has a greater understanding, as would be expected, of the limits of collection at any given time. Intelligence officials know that they are not collecting everything. They make decisions on a regular basis to exclude certain regions or issues. In their own budget requests, intelligence officials also determine how much of the collection to process and exploit, which is always far less than is collected. The intelligence community sees no reasons to convey these facts to the policy makers. At one level, doing so is unnecessary. A region not receiving much collection allocation may stay quiet, which is the bet that the intelligence managers are making. At another level, it may undermine their relationship with policy makers. Why arouse concerns about collection coverage over an issue that is not expected to be a significant priority? Their choices can lead to even worse relations should one of the regions suddenly become a concern and collection be found wanting.
ANALYSIS. Policy makers want information that enables them to make an informed decision, but they do not come to this part of the process as blank slates or wholly objective observers. Already in favor of certain policies and outcomes, they would like to see intelligence that supports their preferences. Again, this is not necessarily as crass as it sounds. Policy makers only naturally prefer intelligence that enables them to go where they want. This attitude becomes problematic only when they ignore intelligence that is compelling but contrary to their preferences.
INTELLIGENCE UNCERTAINTIES AND POLICY
In 1987 U 5.-Soviet negotiations were drawing to a close on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The US intelligence community had three methods for estimating the number of Soviet INF missiles that had been produced-all of which had to be accounted for and destroyed. Meanwhile, any final number given by the Soviets would be suspect.
Each of the three major intelligence agencies advocated its methodology and its number as the one that should go forward But the senior intelligence officer responsible for the issue decided, correctly, that all three numbers had to go to President Ronald Reagan. Some agency representatives argued that this was simply pusillanimous hedging. But the intelligence officer argued that the president had to be aware of the intelligence uncertainties and the possible range of missile numbers before he signed the treaty. That was the right answer, instead of choosing, perhaps arbitrarily, among the methodologies.
Some policy makers also want to keep their options open for as long as possible. They may resist making important decisions. Intelligence can occasionally serve to limit options by indicating that some options are either insupportable or may have dangerous consequences. The imposition of such limitations serves as yet another area of friction.
Intelligence often deals in ambiguities and uncertainties. If a situation were known with certainty, intelligence would not be needed. (Soe box, “Intelligence Uncertainties and Policy. ”) Honestly reported intelligence highlights uncertainties and ambiguities, which may prove to be discomforting to policy makers for several reasons. First, if their goal is intelligence that helps them make decisions, anything that is uncertain and ambiguous is going to be less helpful or perhaps even a hindrance. Second, some policy makers cannot appreciate why the multibillion-dollar intelligence