Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [164]
WHAT PRICE OVERSIGHT FAILURES? Even when the intelligence oversight system is working well, most members and congressional staff have difficulty running the system so as to avoid all lapses. Most members and staff involved in the process understand the difference between small lapses and large ones. Some of the larger lapses for which Congress has taken the intelligence community to task are• Failure to inform the Senate Intelligence Committee that CIA operatives were directly involved in mining Corinto, a Nicaraguan port, during the contra war. The CIA let it appear that the contras had carried this out on their own. When the truth became known, not only did Vice Chairman Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., resign—although he later changed his mind—but Chairman Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., also reprimanded DCI William J. Casey (1981-1987) in harsh and public terms.
• Failure to inform Congress on a timely basis when agents in Moscow began to disappear, which was later presumed to be the result of the espionage of CIA agent Aldrich Ames. (The assessment as to who caused the losses may have changed as a result of the damage assessment from the Robert Hanssen spy case.) The House Intelligence Committee issued a public report critical of the CIA, with which the CIA agreed.
More recently, Congress has raised the issue of the destruction of tapes made during the interrogations of two senior al Qaeda members. According to a statement by DCIA General Hayden, the tapes were made to ensure that the interrogations were being conducted properly. The existence of the tapes was known to some members of Congress and executive branch officials. Several officials in both branches of government expressed the view that the tapes should not be destroyed. However, in 2005, NCS director Jose Rodriguez ordered the tapes destroyed, informing his superiors at the CIA after the fact. Several members of Congress said they had not known about the existence of the tapes; others knew about the tapes but not about their destruction. The tapes’ controversy raises a series of issues, including internal controls at the CIA, the explicitness (or lack thereof) of the various recommendations not to destroy the tapes, and notification of Congress. Congress is to be notified of “significant intelligence activity,” but it is unclear, as yet, whether destruction of the tapes constitutes such an activity, as defined in legislation. It is also unclear that Congress will want to be in a position where it asks for approval rights before various types of intelligence can be destroyed—which also might raise new separation of powers issues.
Congress does have at hand some levers to enforce its oversight. It can reduce the intelligence budget, delay nominations, or, in the case of a serious lapse, demand the resignation of the official involved, although that decision is ultimately up to the official and the president. If the lapse is serious enough and can be traced back to the president, impeachment might be an option. In the two cases cited above, Congress did not impose any of these penalties. As this book went to press, the investigation into the destruction of the tapes was in an early stage; Rodriguez had already retired.
But even without inflicting concrete penalties, Congress can enforce its oversight. The loss of officials’ credibility before their major committees is serious in and of itself. As hackneyed as it sounds, much of Washington runs on the basis of trust and the value of one’s word. Once credibility and trust are lost, as happened to Casey in the Corinto affair, they are difficult to regain.
INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Even though oversight is inherent in the entire congressional process, the way Congress organizes itself to handle intelligence oversight is somewhat peculiar.
WHY SERVE ON AN INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE? Members of Congress take office with specific areas of interest, derived from either the nature of their district or state or their