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Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [189]

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the cold war. Terrorist groups, unlike the Soviet Union, do not operate from large, easily identifiable infrastructures and do not rely on extensive communications networks. As more becomes known publicly about U.S. intelligence sources and methods, terrorists have made greater efforts to avoid detection. For example, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden reportedly gave up the use of cell phones and fax machines to avoid being located by the United States. Also, terrorist groups do not conduct large-scale repetitive exercises, as do organized military forces. Thus, the visible signature of terrorists is much smaller than is that of the Soviet Union or any nation-state. But, the intelligence community still has to some extent a cold war legacy collection system developed to track a large political-military structure. Another major distinction between the Soviet target and the terrorist target has been noted by John McLaughlin, former deputy DCI: in the case of the Soviets we had a good sense of their capabilities but not their intentions. In the case of the terrorists, we know their intentions but not their capabilities.

Analysts sometimes refer to chatter when they describe intelligence on terrorism. “Chatter” is a difficult term to define. It refers less to precise intelligence than to patterns of intelligence: communications and movements of known or suspected terrorists. As chatter increases—more messages, even those that may not contain direct references to attacks—or as suspects suddenly drop from sight, an increased urgency is felt about the possibility of an attack. In that sense, chatter is much like indications and warning (1&W)—anything that represents a change in observed patterns is the subject of increased attention. But chatter is also imprecise and, as terrorists learn more about how the United States collects intelligence, chatter can decrease for reasons other than pending operations.

In the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks, familiar claims were made that the United States was overly reliant on technical intelligence (TECHINT) and needed more human intelligence (HUMINT). Although HUMINT can, theoretically, collect terrorist-related intelligence that TECHINT cannot, the realities of terrorism must again be examined. Terrorist groups, and certainly their leadership cells, tend to be small and well known to one another. They have tended to operate in parts of the world where the United States does not have ready access. Even if trained agents were available who knew the required language and could be provided with a plausible cover story for their presence in one of these areas, penetrating the terrorist organization would remain problematic at best. One does not simply show up in Kabul, ask for the local al Qaeda recruiting office, and then request to see the person in charge. (The press made much in this regard of the activities of the American John Walker Lindh in Afghanistan. Lindh was captured fighting for the Taliban, not for al Qaeda. Recruitment into the Taliban was fairly simple. One had to be a self-professed Muslim willing to carry a gun—a far easier task than joining al Qaeda.) Finally, if HUMINT penetration were to be achieved, the new recruit would likely be asked to take part in some operation to prove his or her commitment to the cause. This raises important moral and ethical issues for intelligence. How far would the United States be willing to go to sustain a HUMINT penetration—putting an agent’s life at risk by taking part in a terrorist operation?

Some advocacy for more HUMINT was odd in that it seemed to treat HUMINT as a numbers issue: that is, if enough agents were sent, penetrating the target would prove inevitable. Such a scenario shows a fundamental misunderstanding of how HUMINT operates and the nature of the terrorist target. HUMINT is not an en masse activity. It relies on precision.

Finally, much of U.S. HUMINT against the Soviet Union was carried out in foreign diplomatic posts outside of the Soviet Union, where Soviet officials were present and more accessible. Terrorists

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