Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [191]
WAR ON TERRORISM. The intelligence services have two roles in the campaign against terrorism: defense and offense. Defense consists of preventing future attacks by disrupting them or deterring them. This means, in turn, trying to obtain both detailed intelligence about any attacks that are being planned as well as ongoing intelligence about terrorist organizations. One of the most difficult aspects of defense is learning to think like a terrorist. This means not only being able to conceive of attacks that many analysts would consider too horrific to contemplate for long but also to appreciate the importance of randomness, which is a key ingredient of terror. It has been suggested that terrorist analysts focus too much on specific dates and events (holiday travel periods, major sporting events, national holidays). Although these dates have symbolic value or indicate periods when large numbers of people are either traveling or gathering in one place, they also may be easier to defend against. Of the major terrorist attacks that have occurred to date, only one—the failed Millennium attack at the beginning of 2000—was tied to an iconic date. In other words, this may be another case of mirror imaging. How successful are analysts at thinking like terrorists versus thinking like Westerners thinking like terrorists?
Offense consists of identifying, locating, and then attacking terrorists. These activities are important not only for eliminating terrorists but for introducing uncertainty into their activities and making it more difficult for the terrorists to organize, plan, and train. Offensive activities go from analysis into operations and raise questions about assassinations, renditions, and detentions. The war on terrorism adds another intelligence burden: support to military operations. This requirement encompasses both the usual military-related support and new activities. For example, the press has reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has a Special Activities Division in the National Clandestine Service (formerly the Directorate of Operations, DO) that was engaged in operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Although little is known publicly about the division, it would appear to occupy a niche between Special Forces and the National Clandestine Service’s paramilitary activities in support of indigenous groups, such as the contras or the Mujaheddin. Also, some important developments have been made in geospatial intelligence with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and commercial imagery.
One of the most difficult aspects of the campaign against terrorism is trying to gauge the relative degree of success. Unlike conventional wars, there are no battle fronts moving one way or another. Nor is it clear that the absence of another attack entirely means success. Again, it is possible that the nature of the terrorist organization has changed under the pressure of the U.S. response since 2001, going from a more centrally controlled structure to a looser one in which there may be many small centers of activity rather than a central one. If this is so, then the intelligence agencies face uncertainty about what this means for the future of terrorist attacks and for the best way to counter terrorists, both defensively and offensively. It is known that al Qaeda has fairly long planning cycles. Therefore, a quiescent period may simply be somewhere in this cycle. Also, it matters how one thinks about the terrorist issue. Although the United States has not been attacked since 2001, the other attacks—Bali (2002 and 2005), Madrid (2004), London