Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [195]
Several points stand out across these various efforts. First, as stated earlier, the campaign against terrorism has forced the intelligence agencies to reexamine how they operate and the types of information that may be useful. Second, these efforts underscore the multifaceted aspects of countering terrorism and the difficulties inherent in combating it. The terrorism target is, in many ways, much more complex than was the old Soviet foe. Third, even with a well-conceived collection plan, it will be very difficult to coordinate all of these efforts and to use the collected data in ways that produce meaningful results, as opposed to overwhelming analysts with huge databases. Fourth, these efforts will increase the demands for oversight of intelligence, both internally and externally.
PROLIFERATION
Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been a long-standing goal of U.S. policy, but it is now a more important issue with added dimensions. The United States has always given primary emphasis to nuclear weapons, given their lethal capability and the fact that they were central to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. But even during the cold war, the United States also worked to contain the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW or CW and BW). The nexus between terrorism and WMD has given added importance to the issue. Since the Iraq WMD estimate in 2002, intelligence efforts regarding proliferation have been an ongoing source of controversy and of political and sometimes partisan debate.
There are two major strands in proliferation, which are not entirely separate. The first is the requirement to keep track of the WMD activities of nation states, both for their own sake as factors in regional stability and as possible sources of material to terrorists. Then there is the terrorist nexus itself. Al Qaeda has stated bluntly that one of its goals is to obtain WMD—again, simplifying the intentions question but not the capabilities question. The primary concern in state-based activity is nuclear weapons, although some attention is paid to the CW and BW programs of various states as well. There clearly has been an unwelcome shift in nuclear proliferation since 1998, when India and then Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. Since then, North Korea has claimed to have tested a nuclear weapon (October 2006) and Iran has defied United Nations (UN) Security Council efforts to curtail its enrichment activities. The February 2004 admissions by A. Q. Khan also made public the details of a web of private firms and experts trading in nuclear expertise and technology.
ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. The task for intelligence agencies is to identify which nations may be pursuing any or all WMD and then try to determine the state of their programs, as well as connections to other programs, sources of material, expertise, and so forth. This also represents a shift, as a sub rosa network of goods and expertise has developed, complicating efforts to isolate and understand programs. The most obvious problem is that these programs all operate covertly, and some of them may have perfectly legal, nonlethal applications as well. This is certainly true of nuclear programs, which can have connections to peaceful uses of nuclear material, such as power plants.
All U.S. intelligence efforts on proliferation continue to be seen through the prism of the October 2002 NIE on Iraq WMD. The absence of WMD in Iraq was a major factor in the impetus behind the 2004 intelligence legislation, which ostensibly addresses the issue of combating terrorism. Of the two issues—September 11 and Iraq WMD—the Iraq issue is far more serious in terms of the future of the intelligence community. For all of the pre-September 11 warnings about al Qaeda hostility, including the