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hinges on new intelligence that called into question earlier judgments. Analysts apparently subjected the new intelligence to intense review to be certain that it was not part of an Iranian deception plan and came away satisfied with the reliability of the new intelligence. Reactions to the new Iran estimate were largely political in nature, some seeing it as a case of the intelligence community “learning the lessons” of Iraq WMD, or expiating themselves for the earlier mistaken estimate, or attempting to prevent President George W. Bush from taking military steps against Iran. Although the first explanation (learning the “lessons” of Iraq) may be true, the other two certainly are not. These seem to be more cases of individuals projecting their own views on to the estimative process. It is worth noting that the sharp reactions to the new Iran estimate prompted the principal deputy DNI, Donald Kerr (2007- ), to issue a statement defending the analytic tradecraft and judgments in the new NIE.

Because of the political controversy surrounding the new judgments, other issues about the Iran nuclear program and the NIE were lost in the noise. First, the new estimate did not appreciably change the estimated timelines by which Iran could achieve a nuclear weapon if it wanted to. Second, there was little discussion about why Iran would have ceased its weapons program in 2003, although a logical conclusion might be Iran’s concerns after the allied invasion of Iraq because of ostensible WMD programs. Third, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen both noted, there was nothing preventing Iran from reversing its 2003 decision and resuming weapons development. Finally, there is also the possibility that the new estimate is in error. The key estimative judgment in the 2007 NIE was made with “high confidence,” meaning high quality intelligence. But, as the “Estimative Language” text box that accompanies each NIE notes: “A ‘high confidence’ judgment is not a fact or a certainty... and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong.”

In short, intelligence can bring important assets to bear on WMD proliferation, but it will always be a shadowy area and one liable to analytic missteps. By the beginning of 2008, the memory of the Iraq estimate and concerns about Bush administration policy vis-à-vis Iran made it increasingly difficult for the intelligence community to produce analysis on proliferation without it being received in a highly politicized manner. This is the sort of distraction that analysts are taught to rise above or to ignore but this makes it increasingly difficult to write objectively on proliferation.

NARCOTICS

Narcotics policy is a difficult area in which to work. The main goal is to prevent individuals. by a variety of means, from using drugs that the government deems addictive and harmful. Almost everyone who has ever worked on narcotics policy has said that it is a domestic issue, not a foreign policy issue. Also, given the fact that individuals use drugs for numerous reasons, preventing their use is a difficult goal to attain. For both practical and political reasons, narcotics has become, in part, a foreign policy problem, because the United States attempts to reduce the overseas production of illegal drugs and to intercept them before or just as they arrive in the country.

The intelligence community is capable of collecting and analyzing intelligence related to the illicit trade in narcotics. The plants from which certain narcotics are derived can be grown in large quantities only in certain parts of the world. Coca is produced in the Andean region of South America. Poppies, from which heroin is made, are grown predominantly in two parts of southern Asia, centering roughly on Afghanistan and Myanmar (formerly Burma). Areas where these plants are processed into narcotics are also fairly well known, as are the routes customarily used to ship the finished products to customer areas.

The real problem lies in converting this intelligence into successful policy. Efforts