Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [210]
If a country threatens to make war or if war seems imminent, does the concept of self-defense allow states to engage preemptively in certain activities, including intelligence operations? In an age of information operations, this question is increasingly important. The George W. Bush administration in 2003 advocated a preemptive strategy as part of its rationale for the war against Iraq, but it is not clear that this will have continued support in that war’s aftermath, given that the expected weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) were not found.
The campaign against terrorists occupies a still undefined middle ground between war and peace. In part, it is a military campaign, largely being conducted in Afghanistan and in Iraq against pro-al Qaeda elements (as distinct from efforts against Iraqi Sunnis or Shi’ites who are not supportive of al Qaeda). In part it is a law enforcement activity, within the United States and overseas as well. But there are also aspects of the effort against terrorists that fall in between these two positions. The implications of this issue are discussed later in the chapter.
ENDS VERSUS MEANS. The usual answer to the question “Do the ends justify the means?” is no. But if the ends do not justify the means, what does? Policy makers face difficult choices when means and ends are in conflict. For example, during the cold war, was it proper for the United States, which advocated free elections, to interfere in Western European elections in the late 1940s to preclude communist victories? Which choice was preferable: upholding moral principles or allowing a politically unpalatable and perhaps threatening outcome? How does U.S. interference in postwar European elections compare with the subversion of the Chilean economy as a means of undermining the government of Salvador Allende?
Within the U.S. political experience, such questions represent two deeply rooted concepts: realpolitik and idealism. In the milieu of the cold war, realpolitik predominated. The moral aspect of the cold war (Western democratic ideals versus Soviet communism) made choices such as those described above easy for policy makers. Would they make the same choices in the post-cold war world in the absence of such a moral imperative?
Again, these concerns are at issue in the campaign against terrorism and the constant struggle to balance civil liberties and national security. Some of those who believe that it is necessary to make adjustments to civil liberties in order to preserve the larger framework of our government use the phrase “the Constitution is not a suicide pact.” Federal appellate court Judge Richard Posner is a leading proponent of this view, which has its roots in the similar dilemma faced by President Abraham Lincoln and the suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War. Lincoln argued that it was necessary to suspend one law, habeas corpus, in order to preserve the Union and enforce all laws in the seceding states. In a July 1861 message to Congress, Lincoln posed the question this way: “To state the question more directly, are all the laws, but one [habeas corpus], to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?” Again, the issue is one of balance.
THE NATURE OF THE OPPONENT. For nearly half a century the United States faced successive totalitarian threats: the Axis and then the Soviet Union and its satellite states. A vast gulf existed between the accepted values and behavioral norms of the United States and its allies and their opponents. Do the actions of your opponents affect the actions you may undertake? Are they a useful guide to action?
“All’s fair in . . .” is