Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [213]
The issue of changing moral standards arises again with the interrogation of known or suspected terrorists. As was noted earlier, the various interrogation techniques that have been used were vetted by the Justice Department and others in the executive branch and were briefed to a limited number of senators and representatives, who were also supportive, according to press accounts. But between these decisions in 2002 and 2006, there had been a shift in political opinion, with many members of Congress expressing more qualms about the types of techniques that could be used. Director of the CIA (DCIA) General Hayden said in February 2008 that water boarding—a form of interrogation—was undertaken based on this Justice Department ruling, only used in a few cases and that, in his opinion, it would no longer be allowed under the rules now in force. If the standards for interrogation do change, should officers who conducted interrogations based on former standards be held liable for their actions?
ISSUES RELATED TO COLLECTION AND COVERT ACTION
Many ethical and moral issues arise from collection and covert action. As with the broad moral issues. there are many questions and little consensus on answers.
HUMINT. HUMINT collection involves the manipulation of other human beings as potential sources of information. The skills required to be a successful HUMINT collector are acquired over time with training and experience. They basically involve psychological techniques to gain trust, including empathy, flattery, and sympathy. The more direct methods of gaining cooperation include bribery, blackmail, and sex. (National Clandestine Service offices note that they do not use blackmail or sex as a means of recruiting spies, if for no other reasons than that these spies are not reliable.)
Two issues predominate. The first is the morality of the manipulation itself. One might argue that psychological techniques are used on someone who is already susceptible to manipulation. An unwilling subject will likely terminate the relationship. (Walk-ins are different by virtue of the fact that they volunteer their services.) Are these legitimate activities to be undertaken by a government against the citizens of another country, whether an enemy or not?
The second issue is the responsibility of the government doing the recruiting to the source.
• How far does the government’s responsibility go?
• How deep an obligation, if any, does the government incur in the recruitment?
• If the HUMINT asset is compromised, how far should the recruiter go to maintain the asset’s safety? Does this obligation extend to his or her family as well?
• What if the asset has not been productive for some time? For how long a period is the government obliged to protect the asset once the relationship ended its usefulness?
• What if the asset proves to be unproductive? Perhaps the asset has misrepresented his or her access and capabilities. Is there still an obligation?
One of the most compelling arguments in favor of strong and continued responsibility for recruited sources has little to do with morality and ethics. It is the more practical concern that recruitment of new sources becomes more difficult if word gets out that current or former sources are not given the support and protection they need. In other words, failing to protect a source is bad for business.
Another issue tends to be specific to certain areas, such as terrorism and narcotics, that depend heavily on HUMINT for good intelligence. To collect that intelligence, U.S. officials must develop contacts with—and usually pay money to—members of terrorist or narcotics-trafficking organizations. These people have the needed intelligence. Such a case arose in 1995, when the press reported that a CIA-paid asset was instrumental in the arrest of the terrorist known as Carlos. The asset was also a terrorist, a member of Carlos’s group.