Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [222]
FURTHER READINGS
Barry, James A. “Covert Action Can Be Just.” Orbis 37 (summer 1993): 375-390.
———. The Sword of Justice: Ethics and Coercion in International Politics. New York: Praeger, 1998. Erskine, Tom. “‘As Rays of Light to the Human Soul’? Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering.” Intelligence and National Security 19 (summer 2004): 359-381.
Godfrey, E. Drexel. “Ethics and Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs 56 (April 1978): 624-642. (See also the response by Art Jacobs in the following issue.)
Helms, Richard, with William Hood. A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency. New York: Random House, 2003.
Herman, Michael. “Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001.” lntelligence and National Security 19 (summer 2004): 342-358.
Lauren, Paul Gordon. “Ethics and Intelligence.” In lntelligence: Policy and Process. Ed. Alfred C. Maurer and others. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985.
Levinson, Sanford. ed. Torture: A Collection. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Masters, Barrie P. “The Ethics of Intelligence Activities.” Washington, D.C.: National War College, National Security Affairs Forum, spring-summer 1976.
Posner, Richard A. Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006.
Powers, Thomas. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA. New York: Knopf, 1979.
Sorel, Albert. Europe under the Old Regime Trans. Francis H. Herrick. New York: Harper and Row, 1947.
CHAPTER 14
INTELLIGENCE REFORM
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE, alter, or reorganize the intelligence community are as old as the community itself. Richard A. Best Jr., in a Congressional Research Service (CRS) study prepared for the House Intelligence Committee as part of its review of intelligence community functions (IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century), examined nineteen major studies, reviews, and proposals, covering the period 1949 to 1996, for change in the intelligence community. For devotees and critics of the community, reform is something of a cottage industry. Like the caucus race in Alice in Wonderland, debates over intelligence reform seem to have neither a beginning nor an end.
“Intelligence reform” is a catchall phrase, used to connote any and all efforts to make significant changes in the intelligence community. However, in the mid-1970s, in the aftermath of the Church and Pike Committees’ investigations, “reform” took on a more specific meaning. It referred to efforts to prevent the recurrence of abuses of authority or illegal acts that had been uncovered by the committees and the earlier “family jewels” report, written at the direction of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) James Schlesinger (1973), describing illegal Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities.
The use of the word “reform” remains problematic in that it can imply that something needs fixing, as opposed to simply being improved. In this chapter, “reform” should be read in the broader, more benign sense of the word—improvement, not the correction of abuses.
THE PURPOSE OF REFORM
When one sifts through the reform proposals, a key question must be asked: What is the purpose of the reforms? In his CRS study. Best delineated three broad chronological categories of proposals.
1. To improve the efficiency of the intelligence community in the context of the cold war
2. To respond to specific intelligence failures or improprieties, including the Bay of Pigs, the “family jewels,” the Iran-contra affair, and others
3. To refocus intelligence community requirements and structure in the post-cold war era
The third category, post-cold war efforts to update the