Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [24]
In short, the intelligence community has entered a new era, with major new offices and relationships. How well various offices work and whether they achieve the desired goals will not be entirely evident for several years. In February 2005, President Bush nominated the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, to be the first DNI and Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), to be his principal deputy. However, in May 2006, DCIA Porter Goss stepped down and General Hayden replaced him. In January 2007, Negroponte was named deputy secretary of state and in February 2007 he was replaced as DNI by Mike McConnell, a retired vice admiral who had served as the J-2 (senior intelligence officer on the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and director of NSA. Hayden’s former position as principal deputy DNI went untilled for more than a year. Thus, there was a fair amount of personnel turmoil in the senior intelligence positions during the first two years of the new structure. It also took more than a year to find a suitable new principal deputy DNI. Some observers believe that the problems encountered in finding suitable candidates for these jobs (including the first DNI nomination) reflects the inherent difficulty of the jobs themselves and the bureaucratic struggles they face.
General Hayden’s transfer, McConnell’s nomination, and the 2007 nomination of retired Air Force general James Clapper to be the new undersecretary of defense for intelligence (USDI) led some in Congress and some observers to raise concerns about the influence of the military in the intelligence community. Although there had been several DCIs and deputy DCIs who were military officers, they never served simultaneously. During the years in which there was a DCI and two deputy DCIs (one for the CIA, one for the intelligence community, 1996-2005), the law stated that only one of the three could be a military officer, meaning active duty or retired within the previous ten years. Supporters of the new team noted that McConnell and Clapper were retired, that they were all professional intelligence officers, and also pointed out that their extensive past experience of working together was an asset that would help overcome bureaucratic obstacles in their respective organizations.
One of the issues facing any DNI is the continuing disparity between his or her responsibilities for the intelligence community and his or her actual authority over the various agencies, a problem that existed under the DCI as well. DNI Negroponte was not seen as testing his authority to any great extent. (For a more extensive discussion of the state of intelligence reform, see chap. 14.) Negroponte spent more time giving general direction to the intelligence community, publishing a National Intelligence Strategy in October 2005, and other strategic plans. In 2007, DNI McConnell announced a more direct 100 Day Plan and 500 Day Plan.
The National Intelligence Strategy and the 100 and 500 Day Plans are worth examining for the insights they give into where the first two DNIs want to take the intelligence community. Negroponte’s Strategy identifies five mission objectives:• Defeat terrorism
• Prevent and counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
• Bolster the growth of democracy
• Innovate analysis and target penetration
• Identify opportunities and vulnerabilities for decision makers.
The first two mission objectives are straightforward, identifying the two major threats facing the United States. Some controversy arose over the third objective of bolstering democracy. Critics argued that this was not a proper role for intelligence. It is important to understand the National Intelligence