Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [243]
At a basic level, the intelligence requirements of Israel are simple. It is located in the midst of states that either maintain proper diplomatic relations or remain hostile. Both kinds of neighboring states and the Israeli-occupied territories on the West Bank harbor populations that are overtly hostile to Israel and unwilling to countenance its existence. This allows a fair amount of focus but also demands a constant state of readiness. It is difficult to think of another state whose intelligence services face a similar challenge.
Given this milieu, Israeli intelligence activities have always been given a fair amount of latitude and have become both legendary and controversial. Over the years, a number of successful HUMINT penetrations into Egypt and Syria have been conducted. However, one operation against Egypt in the early 1950s was discovered, resulting in the deaths of four Israeli agents and the prolonged incarceration of several others. It became known as the Lavon affair, after the defense minister at the time, Pinhas Lavon.
A more recent controversy involved a U.S. naval intelligence analyst, Jonathan Pollard. He appears to have been a walk-in, motivated by concerns that the United States was not sharing vital intelligence with Israel. However, Pollard also accepted cash and gifts in exchange for the intelligence he provided, including intelligence reports, imagery, and information about weapons systems. In 1985 he was arrested outside the Israeli Embassy, and in 1987 he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Some people felt that the sentence was too harsh, although successive reviews of Pollard’s case have upheld the initial concerns that prompted the sentence.
Israel initially attempted to pass off the case as a rogue operation but, in early 1998, admitted that Pollard had been working as a regular agent. In 2006, Rafi Eitan, who had been Pollard’s handler, said that the information that Pollard provided was too good to resist and that Eitan could not put a stop to the operation. Pollard had also been granted Israeli citizenship. The Pollard case became a constant irritant in U.S.-Israeli relations, not only because of the ill will it engendered but also because of constant Israeli attempts to get Pollard released. Most significant, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu raised the Pollard issue during the 1998 peace talks at Wye River, where President Bill Clinton brought the Israelis and Palestinians together. Clinton appeared to be receptive to releasing him. DCI George J. Tenet (1997-2004) reportedly threatened to resign if Pollard was pardoned and released to Israel, whereupon Clinton dropped the issue. (Pollard supporters argue that the United States traded Soviet spy Rudolf Abel for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in the 1960s, thus creating a precedent. However, although the United States has proven willing to repatriate a foreign spy in exchange for a U.S. intelligence officer, it does not trade U.S. citizens convicted of espionage.) The Pollard case is a classic example of a successful penetration whose political costs may far outweigh any intelligence that was obtained.
Concerns about Israeli intelligence collection overseas continue to be problematic. In 2004, the FBI said that Israel had been overly aggressive in collecting information at military equipment exhibitions. The information involved appeared not to be classified but the persistence of Israelis in asking questions about certain equipment had raised concerns. The FBI also had under investigation a U.S. Defense Department official who might have passed information to Israel. New Zealand jailed and then expelled two Israelis for attempting to obtain New Zealand passports illegally. The New Zealand government accused them of being Mossad agents. They denied the allegation but admitted having committed criminal activity. Israel’s Foreign Ministry issued an official apology in 2005. Access to foreign passports is essential to all intelligence agencies, which use them