Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [253]
IC21: The Intelligence Community in the Twenty-first Century, 1996. Study by the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, contemporaneous with Aspin-Brown. Sought to create a more corporate intelligence community, with the DCI acting as a chief executive officer. Recommendations included DCI concurrence in the secretary of defense’s appointments of National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) defense agencies; increased DCI programmatic control over NFIP agency budgets and personnel; creation of a second deputy DCI for community management; consolidation and rationalization of certain management and infrastructure functions across the intelligence community; creation of a Technical Collection Agency to manage signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and measurement and signatures intelligence; and creation of an intelligence community reserve.
Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force (Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence), 1996. Recommended improvements in the requirements and priorities process; less emphasis on long-term estimates on familiar topics and broad trends; greater use of open sources; increased influence of the DCI over intelligence components; and creation of an intelligence reserve.
Hart-Rudman Commission (U.S. Commission on National Security, Twenty-first Century), 2001. Recommended, in Phase II of the study, that the National Intelligence Council devote resources to the issues of homeland security and asymmetric threats; the NSC should establish a strategic planning staff, one of whose roles would be to establish national intelligence priorities; the DCI should emphasize recruitment of HUMINT sources on terrorism; and the intelligence community should place new emphasis on collection and analysis of economic and scientific and technologic security concerns and should make greater use of open-source intelligence, with budget increases for these activities.
9/11 Commission (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States), 2004. Some recommendations were enacted into law in 2004, primarily the supplanting of the DCI with a DNI not tied to any agency and the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center, which President George W. Bush already had under way. Also recommended that all analytic efforts be organized by topical centers and that the Defense Department be responsible for all paramilitary operations.
WMD Commission (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction), 2005. Formed to investigate intelligence performance on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and other issues. Recommended that the DNI create mission managers to be responsible for all aspects of intelligence on high-priority issues; a more integrated collection enterprise; a National Counterproliferation Center to coordinate collection and analysis for counterproliferation; an Open Source Directorate at CIA; and a new national security service within the Federal Bureau of Investigation that would include counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and intelligence activities. In June 2005, President George W. Bush accepted seventy of the seventy-four recommendations.
Author Index
Note: This index lists the names from FURTHER READINGS at the end of each chapter.
Adams, Sam
Adler, Emanuel
Aguilar, Louis
Aid, Matthew M.
Albats, Yevgenia
Albini, Joseph L.
Aldrich, Richard W.
Ambrose, Stephen E.
Anderson, Julie
Andrew, Christopher
Baker, James E.
Baker, John C.
Bamford, James
Barrett, David M.
Barry, James A.
Bearden, Milt
Bell, J. Dwyer
Bennett, Michael
Benson, Robert Louis
Berkowitz, Bruce D.
Best, Richard A., Jr.
Betts, Richard K.
Bissell, Richard M.
Black, Ian
Blight, James G.
Brownell, George A.
Bruce, James B.
Brugioni, Dino
Burgstaller, Eugen E
Burrows,