Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [65]
DOD is also examining the utility of very small satellites, sometimes referred to as microsatellites (approximately twenty inches high and forty-one inches in diameter). TacSat-1 (tactical satellite) could be launched as demands for collection increased. TacSats would not have the multiyear orbital lives of the more traditional large satellites and would not carry as large a payload of sensors, but they would provide a more flexible collection array and might be useful if satellites were lost to ASATs. Press reports suggest, however, that these satellites still do not have sufficient support within DOD. Tactical satellites also run counter to another U.S. government program, fostering the sharing of satellites by military and domestic agencies. Such satellites would need to have a large array of collectors to be of more general use, which again necessitates a larger satellite.
There have also been several press articles about the possibility of creating microdrones. These are typically compared to dragonflies, and can be as small as six inches (15 cm.) in wingspan. Microdrones are powered so their flight can be controlled and can be equipped with tiny cameras. Microdrones are still experimental and no U.S. agency will acknowledge such a program. These platforms would have the advantage of being relatively inexpensive and could access locations that even UAVs could not target.
The third major imagery development related to the war on terrorism has been the use of NGA imagery platforms on potential terrorist targets within the United States. These have included the 2002 Olympics in Utah, the 2004 political conventions, and other public events that would attract large crowds or locations (such as nuclear power plants) that might be targets. Unlike CIA and NSA, NGA is not restricted in its activity within the United States, although as a defense component NGA cannot be used to support law enforcement. In August 2007, however, the Bush administration announced that it would allow greater access to imagery by state and local officials. Officials argue that this is necessary both to improve homeland security (in such areas as seaport and border security) and also to help with disaster planning or relief. They also argue that these uses do not violate the law enforcement restrictions. Still, various groups that are concerned about intrusive government activities have raised questions about this domestic imagery collection, as have some members of Congress. In October 2007, the Department of Homeland Security announced postponement of the program to address the legal and civil liberties ramifications.
Finally, space-based imagery capabilities have proliferated. Once the exclusive preserve of the United States and the Soviet Union, this field has expanded rapidly. France and Israel have independent imagery satellites. India has a nascent capability; China is rapidly developing one and has announced that it is building a national engineering and research center to design small satellites, hoping to produce six to eight annually. China plans on launching more than one hundred satellites by 2020 for a variety of monitoring tasks within China itself—economic, ecological, and others. Germany has decided to create its own satellite capability. Furthermore, cooperation among current and would-be imagery satellite powers has increased. Israel is reported to have cooperative imagery relationships with India, Taiwan, and Turkey. Brazil and China are cooperating on satellites. Russia, eager for cash, has helped several nations launch satellites, including Israel, Japan, and Iran. Some experts believe that the Iranians seek an independent launch capability, which could be part of their overall missile development program. Perhaps more significant, France is working with several European partners—Belgium, Italy, and Spain—on its next generation of imagery satellites. This independent capability within NATO could