Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [69]
The offense role is made more difficult by the ongoing explosion in the amount of communications worldwide. According to Lucent Technologies, in 2006 there were more than 9.3 trillion e-mails; more than 300 billion voicemail messages; more 18 million new wireless users joining the 1.3 billion already using wireless; more than 123 billion Internet log-ins; and more than 32 million new phone lines. Again, NSA does not have to track all of these communications, but it does have to find the intercepts it needs inside this vast communications haystack.
Likewise, the defensive role is made more difficult by the increasing number of hacking attempts against government computers. Several new procurement programs designed to upgrade NSA infrastructure ran into cost overruns and failed to produce the needed improvements. There have even been concerns that NSA’s obviously high demands for electrical power will soon outstrip available supplies in its home state of Maryland.
The defense role has received increased attention as the number of attacks on U.S. government computers has sharply increased. Defense not only seeks to protect U.S. codes and communications but also the vast array of computers on which the nation relies. In January 2008, President Bush signed a directive authorizing the intelligence community—especially NSA—to monitor the networks of all federal computers as a means of detecting and defending against external attacks. According to press reports, NSA, CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will investigate intrusions by monitoring and reporting on Internet activity. This directive raised concerns about intelligence agencies looking into domestic activities but also was criticized by those concerned about cyber security, because the directive does not include the private sector, where some believe the real danger lies—banks, utilities, and other parts of the critical infrastructure.
An important aspect of SIGINT operations for the United States in combating terrorism is the legal issues involved. Under pre-2001 rules, if the SIGINT target was within the United States, the operation became the responsibility of the FBI, not NSA. To undertake wiretaps in the United States, the FBI must get a court order. Foreign intelligence wiretaps (as opposed to criminal case wiretaps) come under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court, created by the FISA in 1978. This was not seen as a major legal barrier, as the FISA court has reportedly approved 13,164 requests and denied four since its inception. In addition, according to data provided by the court to the Congress, the court approved more than 99.9 percent of all requests for wiretaps between 2000 and 2006.
The changing nature of communications and the campaign against terrorists have also led to requests by U.S. intelligence to change the rules under which they collect SIGINT within the United States. Since 1978, these activities had been conducted under FISA. Although FISA allowed for warrantless wiretaps under certain conditions (a one-year limit, conducted on foreign powers only. authorized by the president via the attorney general), press stories in December 2005 revealed a more extensive use of warrantless wiretaps since 2002. These revelations set off a major political controversy concerning the legal basis of the program as well as efforts to revise the law to adjust to changing circumstances. The details of this controversy are beyond the scope of this book, except to note that not only was there disagreement between the Bush administration and some in Congress over the new wiretap program but also among members of the Bush administration as well.
The new warrantless taps President Bush allowed after the September 11, 2001, attacks were placed on calls between people in the United States and terrorist suspects abroad. The Bush administration argued that the new program was necessary as the taps had to be placed quickly and this did not allow time to go