Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [73]
An important adjunct to one’s own country’s HUMINT capabilities are those of allied or friendly services. Known as foreign liaison relationships, these offer several important advantages. First, the friendly service has greater familiarity with its own region. Second, its government may maintain a different pattern of relations with other states, more friendly in some cases or even having diplomatic relations where one’s own government does not. These HUMINT-to-HUMINT relationships are somewhat formal in nature and tend to be symbiotic. They also entail risks, as one can never be entirely sure of the liaison partner’s security procedures. Thus, there are different degrees of liaison, depending on past experience, shared needs, the sense of security engendered, the depth and value of the intelligence being shared, and so forth. Furthermore, some liaison relationships may be with intelligence services that do not have the same standards in terms of operational limits, acceptable activities, and other criteria. A choice therefore has to be made between the value of the information being sought or exchanged and the larger question of the propriety of a relationship with this service. Nevertheless, liaison is an important means of increasing the breadth and depth of available HUMINT.
Foreign intelligence liaison is carried out on an agency-by-agency basis instead of by the intelligence community as a whole. The CIA, DIA, NGA, and NSA, for example, create and conduct their own liaison relationships, which does raise questions about the possible need for better coordination to avoid duplication. Thus, the stovepipes problem carries over into foreign liaison. This may prove to be a problem for the DNI who is charged with overseeing the coordination of these relationships.
In the war against terrorism, several nations have apparently offered intelligence support to the United States, including some whose services may be considered occasionally hostile. These types of liaison relationships call for extra caution regarding intelligence sharing, and questions may arise about the depth and detail of the intelligence received. However, exchanging useful intelligence is a good way for nations to build confidence in one another. For example, according to press accounts, Russian officers placed nuclear detection equipment in North Korea at the request of the United States to help track possible nuclear developments.
Espionage provides a small part of the intelligence that is collected. GEOINT and SIGINT produce a greater volume of intelligence. But HUMINT, like SIGINT, has the major advantage of affording access to what is being said, planned, and thought. Moreover, clandestine human access to another government may offer opportunities to influence that government by feeding it false or deceptive information. For intelligence targets in which the technical infrastructure may be irrelevant as a fruitful target—such as terrorism, narcotics, or international crime, where the signature of activities is small—HUMINT may be the only available source.
HUMINT also has disadvantages. First, it cannot be done remotely, as is the case with various types of technical collection. It requires proximity and access and therefore must contend with the counterintelligence capabilities of the other side. It is also far riskier, as it jeopardizes individuals and, if they are caught, could have political ramifications that are less likely to occur with technical collectors.
HUMINT is far less expensive than the various technical collectors, although it still involves costs for training, special equipment, and the accoutrements clandestine officers need to build successful cover stories.
Like all the other collection INTs, HUMINT is susceptible to deception. Some critics argue that it is the most susceptible to deception. The bona fides of human sources are always subject to question initially and, in some cases, may never be wholly resolved. Many questions arise and linger. Why is this person offering to pass information—ideology, money, vengeance? The