Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [98]
• Unlikely
• Even Chance
• Probably, Likely
• Almost certainly
Note that there is no certainty at either end of this range. An event that is known to have no chance of occurring will not be analyzed. Nor will an event that is certain to occur be analyzed in terms of likelihood, although its ramifications can be discussed. Phrases like “we cannot rule out” or “we cannot discount” reflect an event that is seen as being unlikely or even remote but “whose consequences are such that it warrants mentioning.” These phrases are classic estimative language and can be interpreted by some readers, again, as a pusillanimous call. Finally, the use of “maybe” and “suggest” are defined as events whose likelihood cannot be assessed because of a paucity of information.
Beyond these uses of language there is the issue of the confidence that the analyst has in his or her judgments, called confidence levels. In NIEs, the confidence levels are “based on the scope and quality of information supporting our judgments.”
• High confidence: judgments based on high-quality information, or the nature of the issue makes a solid judgment possible
• Moderate confidence: available information is susceptible to multiple interpretations; or there may be alternative views; or the information is “credible and plausible” but not sufficiently corroborated
• Low confidence: information is scant, questionable, or fragmented, leading to difficulties in making “solid analytic inferences”; or is based on sources that may be problematic
Publishing a text box of this sort is a major step forward in trying to get the policy readers to understand the basis by which judgments are made. This depends on policy makers reading it and even this will not preclude future misunderstandings about the use of estimative language. Those who do read it will get a much better idea of the layers of meaning inherent in an estimative judgment. There are few, if any, straightforward calls.
INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS. Indications and warnings, or I&W, as it is known among intelligence professionals, is one of the most important roles of intelligence—giving policy makers advance warning of significant, usually military, events. The emphasis placed on I&W in the United States reflects the cold war legacy of a long-term military rivalry and the older roots of the U.S. intelligence community in Pearl Harbor, the classic I&W failure.
I&W is primarily a military intelligence function, with an emphasis on surprise attack. It relies, to a large extent, on the fact that all militaries operate according to certain regular schedules, forms, and behaviors, which provide a baseline against which to measure activity that may raise I&W concerns. In other words, analysts are looking for anything that is out of the ordinary, any new or unexpected activity that may presage an attack: calling up reserves, putting forces on a higher level of alert, dropping or increasing communications activity, imposing sudden communications silence, or sending more naval units to sea. But none of these can be viewed in isolation; they have to be seen within the wider context of overall behavior.
During the cold war, for example, U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) analysts worried about how much warning they would receive