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Intelligence in Nature - Jeremy Narby [89]

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a defective visual pigment gene or the loss of a gene that codes for the red or green visual pigment. Although people with this disorder perceive the world very differently, they are not truly color-blind, for they still have two bright-light visual pigments and use these for dichromatic color vision, a more rudimentary type of color vision. True color-blindness occurs in people who lack both the red and green visual pigments; this condition is extremely rare, occurring in fewer than one person in thirty thousandâ (pp. 31â32).

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P. 115: MODESTY IS A JAPANESE VIRTUE

Davies and Ikeno (2002) write: âThere is a saying in Japanese that is related to the use of modesty: âNo aru taka wa tsume wo kakusu,â or âA clever hawk conceals its talonsâ; i.e., genuinely capable people do not make a show of their abilities. In other words, in Japanese society, it is not good to parade oneâs knowledge, culture, and ability; in fact, it can be dangerous, because students who show their abilities too openly in school or people who excel in society are often bullied or ostracized by othersâ (p. 149).

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P. 117: MINIATURIZATION IN JAPANESE DESIGN

See Davey (2003, p. 95).

CHAPTER 10

P. 123: HUMAN, MAMMALIAN, AND VERTEBRATE BRAINS

Blakeslee (2003) writes: âThe search for brain differences has not been easy. Mammalian brains are extraordinarily similar. All contain an outer ring, or cortex. The human cortex, where intelligence lies, is simply a lot bigger than that of other creatures given the human bodyâs sizeâ (p. 7). LeDoux (2002) writes: âEvery vertebrate brain can be divided into three broad zones: the hindbrain, midbrain, and forebrainâ (p. 34).

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P. 124: DESCARTESâTreatise of Man

See Descartes (1972, orig. 1662, p. 113). I have translated from the French original (Descartes 1953, p. 873) for the quote in the main text.

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P. 125: LIVING BEINGS ARE UNLIKE MACHINES

Denton (2002) writes: âEvery living system replicates itself, yet no machine possesses this capacity even to the slightest degree. Nor has any machineâeven the most advanced envisaged by nanotechnologistsâbeen conceived of that could carry out such a stupendous act. Yet every second countless trillions of living systems from bacterial cells to elephants replicate themselves on the surface of our planet. And since lifeâs origin, endless life forms have effortlessly copied themselves on unimaginable numbers of occasions. Living things possess the ability to change themselves from one form into another. For example, during development the descendants of the egg cell transform themselves from undifferentiated unspecialized cells into wandering amoebic cells, thin plate-like blood cells containing the oxygen-transporting molecule hemoglobin, neuronsâcells sending out thousands of tentacles like miniature medusae some hundred thousand times longer than the main body of the cell. The ability of living things to replicate themselves and change their form and structure are truly remarkable abilities. To grasp just how fantastic they are and just how far they transcend anything in the realm of the mechanical, imagine our artifacts endowed with the ability to copy themselves andâto borrow the term from science fictionâto âmorphâ themselves into different forms. Imagine televisions and computers that duplicate themselves effortlessly and which can also âmorphâ themselves into quite different types of machinesâa television into a microwave cooker, or a computer into helicopter. We are so familiar with the capabilities of life that we take them for granted, failing to see their truly extraordinary characterâ (pp. 84â85). Kurzweil (2002) responds: âWe can build (and already are building) âmachinesâ that have powers far greater than the sum of their parts by combining the chaotic self-organizing design principles of the natural world with the accelerating powers of our human-initiated technology. The ultimate result will be a formidable combination indeedâ (p. 182). See Kurzweil (1999) and Dyson (1997) for arguments undermining some of the distinctions between technology and nature. Damasio

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