Into Cambodia - Keith Nolan [10]
It worked–in fact, the claymores blew away an NVA sapper team returning from a recon of an SF camp–and an impressed Brookshire implemented a saturation campaign of such automatic ambushes through-out the squadron area. Eventually, each crew was assigned its own am-bush, so that a troop with thirty-five vehicles had thirty-five groups of claymores rigged and camouflaged along the dozen or so enemy trails in its sector, all of them set at odd intervals so that an NVA scout detecting one tripwire could not count off a set number of paces to the next. With no villagers in the way, the claymores could be left in place, with only periodic battery checks, for the days or weeks it took for another NVA column to attempt to slip down that trail, or until a hapless deer or monkey walked into them. Every morning, more shattered bodies and blood trails were counted, more claymores were rigged, and NVA reinforcements and supplies logjammed in the Fishhook while the NVA expended their energy cutting new trails. Maps and documents taken from the bodies of enemy couriers pinpointed new trails and new plans, as did the prolific diaries kept even by NVA privates, and the fresh paths were also surreptitiously stacked with claymores. Captain Menzel commented on their bonanza in a professional journal:
The automatic ambush caught the imagination of the average trooper. Individuals would spend hours thinking of and discussing new ways with which to turn the trick and trump the Viet Cong…. The concept and strategy of employment of the automatic ambush is by no means glorious and requires some serious thought and work. It is, however, a systematic means by which the enemy's freedom of movement can be severely curtailed and even paralyzed…. Many people tend to scoff at the idea that something so simple and basic as a few claymore mines can accomplish what multimillion-dollar aerial delivery systems cannot always do. The results are incontrovertible….
The GIs referred to it as“running the trapline.” Documents taken from the body of an NVA officer revealed that he had been a division supply chief who had probably ventured from his base camp to see for himself why his materials were not getting through to the NVA in the field. Nothing is better for morale than success in combat. Major Donald L. Smart, CO, Air Cavalry Troop, 11th ACR, noted, “One of my biggest jobs was to make sure all of my Pink Teams–Cobra and Loach–did not fly all day for 2d Squadron. That's where they all wanted to go. If there was no action going on when they arrived, they knew that Brookshire and Franks would stir something up.”
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Simply put, the 11th Armored Cavalry was beating the North Vietnamese Army on their own turf. The Blackhorse, or Soul Pony, as the regiment was also known because of the rearing black stallion on the shoulder patch, was proof that even in the waning dog days of a miserable little war, the combination of solid leadership plus enough exposure to the enemy to cement a solid camaraderie among the troops could still produce sterling results. The incumbent commander, Colonel Starry, a West Pointer, quite simply had the right stuff, as did Lieutenant Colonel Brook-shire. That combination of genuine intellect, personable self-assurance, and willingness to listen to other ideas, joined with the essential quality of personal bravery, distinguished them as combat leaders over and above military managers.
Starry and Brookshire both had entered the service as enlisted men, both were destined for general's stars, and both understood what many equally adept officers had forgotten: While the helicopter was an excellent command platform, it was too easy to become just a speck in the sky and a voice on the radio that seemed